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INTRODUCTION 
When Congress drafted the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (PPACA),1 Democratic lawmakers and most legal scholars had 
 
† Fred D. and Elizabeth L. Turnage Professor of Law and Public Health, Wake 
Forest University.  I thank Jud Campbell, Michael Curtis, Michael Gerhardt, Bradley 
Joondeph, Jason Mazzone, Wilson Parker, Ted Ruger, and Sally Sanford for helpful 
guidance and Trevor Ostbye for research assistance. 
1 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (to be codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.). 
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good reason to be confident of its constitutionality.2  Under long-
established precedent, Congress clearly has the authority, if wanted, to 
enact a single-payer socialized insurance system3 using its powers to tax 
and spend for the “general welfare.”4  Far short of this, PPACA’s com-
plex blend of regulations, subsidies, and an individual mandate is vastly 
more protective of insurance markets and individual freedoms than 
any “Medicare for All” scheme would have been.  The idea for an indi-
vidual mandate originated with Republican lawmakers, who never 
questioned its constitutionality until now.5  Congress has nearly un-
bridled authority to regulate products sold in or affecting interstate 
commerce,6 and health insurance is clearly one such product.7  Fur-
 
2 See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. S13,766-67 (daily ed. Dec. 22, 2009) (statement of Sen. 
Max Baucus) (summarizing commentary supporting the proposition that PPACA will 
withstand constitutional scrutiny); Mark A. Hall, The Constitutionality of Mandates to Pur-
chase Health Insurance, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS (SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT S2) 38, 41 (2009) 
(predicting that “either state or federal mandates for either individuals or employers to 
purchase health insurance will pass scrutiny under the U.S. Constitution”); Seth Stern, 
Sharpening Clause, CQ WKLY., Feb. 7, 2011, at 292, 296 (“[A]fter Florida officials first 
filed the suit in March 2010, Charles Fried, a Harvard Law School professor and solicitor 
general during the Reagan administration, called the challenge ‘ridiculous[]’ . . . [and] 
offered to ‘come on [Fox News] and eat a hat which [he] bought in Australia last 
month made of kangaroo skin.’”); Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail Robbers:  The 
Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care Reform 1, 2, 15 (Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law Pub. Law & 
Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 11-25, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1758986 (opining that the “constitutional objections are 
silly,” “[t]heir reasoning is bizarre and mischievous,” and “[s]ome of the law’s oppo-
nents understand perfectly well that . . . their claims are frivolous”); Over 100 Law Pro-
fessors Agree on Affordable Care Act’s Constitutionality, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, http:// 
www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/01/pdf/law_professors_ACA.pdf (last visited 
Mar. 15, 2011) (explaining that current challenges to PPACA “seek to jettison nearly 
two centuries of settled constitutional law”).  But see JENNIFER STAMAN & CYNTHIA 
BROUGHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40725, REQUIRING INDIVIDUALS TO OBTAIN 
HEALTH INSURANCE:  A CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 6-8 (2009) (expressing uncertainty 
about congressional power to mandate insurance purchases). 
3 See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937) (upholding the constitutio-
nality of the Social Security Act of 1935). 
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
5 See Julie Rovner, Republicans Spurn Once-Favored Health Mandate, NAT’L PUB. RA-
DIO (Feb. 15, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=123670612 
(noting that Republicans supported a 1993 bill that would have required an individual 
mandate); see also William H. Frist, Op-Ed., Frist:  An Individual Mandate for Health  
Insurance Would Benefit All, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Sept. 28, 2009), http:// 
www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2009/09/28/frist-an-individual-mandate-for-health-
insurance-would-benefit-all (advocating for an individual mandate). 
6 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15-22 (2005) (summarizing the Supreme 
Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence). 
7 See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 551-53 (1944) (holding 
that regulating insurance falls within Congress’s commerce power). 
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ther, considering the well-understood economics of health insurance,8 
a mandate to obtain insurance is obviously part and parcel of regulat-
ing how insurers design, price, and sell their products. 
Something went wrong on the way to the courthouse, however.  
District courts in Virginia and Florida have ruled that Congress lacks 
the constitutional authority to require legal residents to obtain health 
insurance.9  Three other federal judges have upheld federal authority 
in cases that special interest groups and individual litigants brought.10 
Despite the split outcomes (which fell along the party lines of the 
judges’ appointing presidents), these courts agreed on several issues.  
No court thus far has found a violation of individual rights protected 
by the Bill of Rights, and no court so far has accepted (or indicated 
much support for) the government’s position that Congress’s tax pow-
er supports the mandate.11  In Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Department 
of Health & Human Services, the Northern District of Florida rejected 
the states’ arguments that forcing them to implement key PPACA pro-
visions violates the Tenth Amendment.12  Thus the Commerce Clause 
 
8 See, e.g., LINDA J. BLUMBERG & JOHN HOLAHAN, URBAN INST., DO INDIVIDUAL 
MANDATES MATTER?:  TIMELY ANALYSIS OF IMMEDIATE HEALTH POLICY ISSUES 1 (2008), 
available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411603_individual_mandates.pdf 
(“[M]any individuals will not choose to obtain coverage under a purely voluntary sys-
tem . . . [and] adverse selection will occur.”).  
9 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010); 
Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-0091, 2011 WL 
285683, at *27 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011). 
10 Mead v. Holder, No. 10-0950, 2011 WL 611139, at *21 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011); Li-
berty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10-00015, 2010 WL 4860299, at *16 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 
2010); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882, 895 (E.D. Mich. 2010). 
11 But see Brian Galle, The Taxing Power, the Affordable Care Act, and the Limits of Consti-
tutional Compromise, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 407, 408 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/ 
2011/4/5/galle.html (arguing that the individual-responsibility requirement “is unques-
tionably a tax”); David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey & Jack M. Balkin, Debate, A Healthy De-
bate:  The Constitutionality of an Individual Mandate, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 93, 
102, 106 (2009), http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/HealthyDebate.pdf (Bal-
kin, Rebuttal) (debating both sides of whether the individual mandate falls under the tax 
power).  The Northern District of Florida, for instance, noted that Congress went out of 
its way to call the assessment a penalty rather than a tax.  Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1134-36 (N.D. Fla. 2010).  The 
individual mandate is also distinct from the “play or pay” option that is presented to 
larger employers.  See PPACA §§ 1513, 10106(e)–(f), 26 U.S.C.A. § 4980H (West Supp. 
1A 2010) (detailing employer responsibilities).  An employer’s option is not framed as a 
mandate enforced by a penalty; instead, it is an “assessable payment” required of larger 
employers that opt not to provide coverage.  Id.  Had the individual mandate been 
framed in that fashion, it would more clearly have fallen under the tax power. 
12 See McCollum, 716 F. Supp. 2d at 1154, 1156, 1161.  PPACA gives states consider-
able flexibility in deciding whether and how to establish health insurance exchanges 
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and the ancillary Necessary and Proper Clause will be the primary fo-
cus of ongoing litigation over the constitutionality of health care 
reform.  Conservative legal scholars who have previously criticized the 
expansive scope of federal commerce power see in this litigation the 
opportunity to impose new limits on its capaciousness.13  Accordingly, 
the Commerce Clause arguments merit close attention in order to 
understand their strengths, weaknesses, and implications for other 
areas of constitutional doctrine and public policy. 
This Article begins with the narrow question of whether the Com-
merce Clause by itself allows Congress to mandate insurance, without 
regard to any other aspects of PPACA.  I then consider whether com-
pulsory insurance might also be justified by the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, in view of the broader context of what PPACA as a whole aims 
to achieve and how it is constructed.  In brief, plausible arguments can 
be constructed on both sides of the first issue.  The more persuasive 
positions are that a mandate to obtain insurance constitutes a regula-
tion of commerce and the Commerce Clause’s fundamental purposes 
do not compel limiting congressional authority to regulate inactivity 
simply for the sake of setting some limit.  However, these issues are 
novel ones that lack controlling precedent, and reasoned arguments 
can be formulated to the contrary. 
Despite uncertainty over the mandate in isolation, the conclusion 
is unavoidable that compulsory insurance is a “necessary and proper” 
component of PPACA’s broader regulation of the insurance market, 
which is firmly grounded in the core of the conventional commerce 
power.  Longstanding precedent clearly allows Congress to regulate 
how health insurers design, market, price, and sell their products,14 
 
and accompanying insurance regulations.  See PPACA § 1311, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18031 
(West Supp. 1B 2010); id. § 1321, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18041; id. § 1332, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18052.  
Changes to Medicaid are mandatory for states that continue to participate, but states are 
legally free to withdraw from Medicaid.  See Mark A. Hall, The Factual Bases for Constitu-
tional Challenges to Federal Health Insurance Reform, 38 N. KY. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) 
(manuscript at 43), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1717781.  Moreover, the fed-
eral government bears most of the expense of Medicaid and private insurance expan-
sion—both of which relieve states from existing costs of caring for people without in-
surance.  Id. at 44.  Therefore, the net fiscal impact on states is estimated to be modest 
and may actually be positive.  Id. at 44-50. 
13 See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Friedrich A. von Hayek Lecture, Commandeering the 
People:  Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 581 (2011); Ilya Shapiro, State Suits Against Health Reform Are Well Grounded in 
Law—And Pose Serious Challenges, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1229, 1229-30 (2010). 
14 See United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944) (holding that 
Congress may regulate insurance under the “power of . . . the Commerce Clause”). 
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and there is no substantial disagreement that PPACA’s coverage 
mandate is essential for these unchallenged regulations to be effec-
tive.  Therefore, the only plausible basis to reject the mandate is an 
argument that, for some independent reason, it is constitutionally 
“improper” to mandate insurance.  But no such reason emerges.  Fol-
lowing the Court’s repudiation of Lochner jurisprudence,15 there is no 
conceivable basis to argue that the Constitution specially protects an 
individual’s freedom to be uninsured. 
Moreover, two centuries of precedent under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause squarely permit other individual mandates or regula-
tions of pure inactivity that are connected with a range of federal 
powers.16  Slippery slope concerns are no greater here than for other 
longstanding federal powers, and a bar on any regulation of inactivity 
would preclude federal measures that might, someday soon, be despe-
rately needed.  For instance, authority under the commerce power to 
compel purchases or other actions could well be essential to combat a 
horrifically lethal pandemic.  Unless the Court is willing to foreclose 
such authority and to overturn or contradict firmly established law, 
compulsory health insurance, albeit novel, sits comfortably within the 
full range of modern congressional powers. 
I.  THE COMMERCE CLAUSE MAZE OF ARGUMENTS:  A GUIDED TOUR 
To begin with the sharpest attack, challengers pointedly deny that 
Congress has the power to regulate inactivity, claiming it has never be-
fore done so in the purest form.17  Congress currently regulates many 
forms of inaction by those engaged in commercial activity,18 such as re-
 
15 See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parish, 300 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1937) (abandon-
ing the principles of Lochner). 
16 See infra Part II. 
17 For a critique of the accuracy of this claim, see infra subsection II.C.1.   
18 Indeed, Professor Ruger notes that  
the very first federal statute relating to health care was a mandate to purchase 
health care, applied to ship owners, who were required to provide medicine 
and insure merchant seamen against the costs of treatment.  All ships were re-
quired to “provide[] . . . a chest of medicines, put up by some apothecary of 
known reputation, and accompanied by directions for administering the 
same.”  Masters of ships were also required to “provide . . . for all such advice, 
medicine, or attendance of physicians, as any of the crew shall stand in need 
of in case of sickness . . . without any deduction from the wages of such sick 
seaman or mariner.”   
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quiring businesses to serve patrons without discrimination.19  PPACA, 
however, mandates insurance based simply on the condition of being a 
lawful U.S. resident, without regard to any commercial activity.20 
Observe, first, that this point of attack employs the same strategy 
the Court explicitly rejected in Gonzales v. Raich, which upheld federal 
authority to ban medicinal use of home-grown marijuana.21  There too 
challengers sought “to excise individual applications of a concededly 
valid statutory scheme” by “isolating a ‘separate and distinct’ class of 
activities that [they claimed] to be beyond the reach of federal pow-
er.”22  The Court “refuse[d],” as it “ha[d] done many times before,”23 
to go along with this divide-and-conquer stratagem, holding instead 
that “comprehensive regulatory statutes”24 must be judged as a whole 
and that a “subdivided class of activities” should not be separated for 
constitutional scrutiny if it is “an essential part of the larger regulatory 
scheme.”25  I return to this more integrated view later, but for now, I 
consider the challengers’ arguments on their own terms (even though 
this approach is contrary to Raich’s teaching). 
 
Theodore Ruger, The Centrifugal Constitution of American Health Care 11 n.25 
(Mar. 2, 2011) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, § 8, 1 Stat. 131, 134-35). 
19 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258-62 (1964) 
(upholding federal prohibition of discrimination by motels serving interstate travelers). 
20 PPACA § 1501(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091 (West Supp. 1B 2010); id. § 1501(b), 26 
U.S.C.A. § 5000A(d).  To be precise, the statute does not mandate the purchase of in-
surance, but only that people obtain insurance coverage, including through Medicaid 
or through employer sponsorship.  The penalty for violation, after phase-in, is the 
greater of $695 or 2.5% of taxable income above the personal exemption, but capped 
at the average national cost of “bronze-level” coverage.  Id. § 10106(b)(2), 26 U.S.C.A. 
§ 5000A(c)(2); Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA) § 1002, 
26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A (West Supp. 1A 2010).  Technically, the mandate applies to all legal 
residents who are not in prison and who do not claim a religious exemption, but several 
categories of people are exempt from paying the penalty for noncompliance.  PPACA 
§ 1501(b), 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(d)–(e) (West Supp. 1A 2010).  Exemptions include 
people whose income is below the tax-filing threshold and people who cannot afford 
coverage, which is defined as the lowest-priced individual insurance plan costing them 
more than 8% of their household income.  Id., 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e)(1)–(2).  Exemp-
tions also extend to members of Indian tribes, to individuals with gaps in coverage of 
three months or fewer, and to those suffering general hardship as defined by the De-
partment of Health and Human Services.  Id., 26 U.S.C.A. § 5000A(e)(3)–(5). 
21 545 U.S. 1, 22, 32-33 (2005). 
22 Id. at 23, 26. 
23 Id. at 22. 
24 Id. at 23. 
25 Id. at 26-27. 
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At the outset, there is no established basis for barring the regula-
tion of economic inactivity.  Instead, challengers point to the fact that 
the Court has always considered regulations that involve some type of 
activity.  In doing so, the Court has never articulated, or even sug-
gested, that inactivity is somehow foreclosed from general congres-
sional authority over economic matters that relate to interstate com-
merce.  Some leading precedents repeatedly stress the presence of 
“economic activity,”26 but the focus in all of these rulings has been on 
whether the subject matter is “economic” and not on how active or pas-
sive the enterprise in question is.  “Activity” appears in various permis-
sive or limiting phrases only because activity was what Congress actually 
regulated in these cases.  There is not a breath of suggestion in these 
decisions that Congress may not reach economic inactivity.  The Court 
simply has never been called upon to decide this issue.27 
A.  Is Being Uninsured an Activity? 
The government’s first response to this open issue is to avoid it.  Its 
leading position, which three courts so far have endorsed, is that going 
without insurance is a decision that is sufficiently active to avoid need-
ing to consider whether the commerce power includes inactivity.  The 
action comes not just from a decision to avoid purchase,28 but also 
 
26 See, e.g., id. at 23-25 (noting that prior cases which struck down a congressional 
action as beyond the commerce power did so because these actions did not regulate 
economic activity); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 656-57 (2000) (explaining 
that the “‘economic/noneconomic’ distinction is not easy to apply”); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995) (“[W]e have upheld a wide variety of congressional 
Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where we have concluded that the activity 
substantially affected interstate commerce.”). 
27 The situation is similar, then, to an earlier point in constitutional history when 
Commerce Clause cases only addressed the regulation of goods in transit and not their 
local manufacture prior to transit.  But in those cases, “the Court talked about move-
ment because that was all it needed to talk about to decide the cases before it” and not 
because it meant to limit the scope of federal power.  Robert L. Stern, That Commerce 
Which Concerns More States Than One, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1361 (1934).   
28 See Mead v. Holder, No. 10-0950, 2011 WL 611139, at *18 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011) 
(reasoning that “[i]t is pure semantics to argue that an individual who makes a choice 
to forgo health insurance is not ‘acting’ . . . . Making a choice is an affirmative action, 
whether one decides to do something or not do something.  They are two sides of the 
same coin.  To pretend otherwise is to ignore reality.”).   
 Professor Carlton Lawson notes that concerted refusals to engage in economic ac-
tivity in the form of boycotts or strikes are strongly regulated.  See Carlton Lawson, Inac-
tivity and the Commerce Clause, PRAWFSBLAWG (Jan. 12, 2011, 2:28 PM), http:// 
prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2011/01/inactivity-and-the-commerce-clause.html 
(“[C]onsider the case of ‘economic boycotts[]’ . . . . [People] are literally doing noth-
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from the ensuing consequence that those without insurance will pay 
for care out of pocket or receive care that others pay for.  Factually, 
this is true.29  But conceptually it is contestable that being uninsured is 
activity.  In theory, failure to purchase many goods or services could be 
characterized as decisions to do something else instead.  Not purchas-
ing a car could be framed as a decision to walk, bike, or take public 
transport.30  Thus, opponents ask why the commerce power could not 
be used to mandate the purchase of automobiles, or almost any other 
consumer good, in order to stimulate the relevant economic sector. 
“Aggregation theory” offers one way to parse this conceptual de-
bate.  Various Supreme Court decisions address whether wholly local 
activity is sufficiently part of a broader interstate market to justify ag-
gregating local with interstate commerce.  Home-grown wheat and 
marijuana meet the test, since, as Gertrude Stein reminds us, “a rose is 
a rose is a rose.”31  Thus, in Wickard v. Filburn and Raich, growing your 
own wheat or marijuana, rather than purchasing it, can be made a fed-
eral offense.32  Challengers object that growing wheat or marijuana is an 
action, but so is seeking care without insurance.  Just as federal regula-
tion aggregated home-grown crops with purchased crops, so too might 
it aggregate purchasing care out of pocket with health insurance. 
 
ing, yet our widespread terminology explicitly describes this inactivity as ‘economic’ 
and assumes that the boycott will have an economic effect.”).  But, as comments to the 
blog posting note, these are more active refusals than simply being uninsured, and 
they have other attributes that expose them to regulation, such as market power, col-
lective action, or preexisting employment.  Id. 
29 “Overall, almost two-thirds (62.6%) of people who are uninsured at a given 
point in time had at least one visit to a doctor or emergency room within the prior 
year. . . . [V]irtually all of them (94%) receive some level of medical care at some 
point.”  Hall, supra note 12 (manuscript at 30-31).  And for this care uninsured people 
pay for only about a third of the overall costs of the services they receive; the rest is 
paid by the government, charity, or cost shifting to insured patients.  INST. OF MED., 
INSURING AMERICA’S HEALTH:  PRINCIPLES AND RECOMMENDATIONS 50-51 (2004). 
30 The Florida court elaborated, 
There is quite literally no decision that, in the natural course of events, does 
not have an economic impact of some sort.  The decisions of whether and 
when (or not) to buy a house, a car, a television, a dinner, or even a morning 
cup of coffee also have a financial impact that—when aggregated with similar 
economic decisions—affect the price of that particular product or service and 
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. 
Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-0091, 2011 WL 
285683, at *27 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).  
31 GERTRUDE STEIN, Sacred Emily, in GEOGRAPHY AND PLAYS 178, 187 (1922). 
32 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 19 (2005); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-
28 (1942). 
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The difficulty with this aggregation analogy is that in Wickard and 
Raich, it was the federal regulation that aggregated the two domains 
under the single umbrella of a particular product.  Here the domains 
of purchasing insurance and purchasing health care could easily be 
considered different, and PPACA does not necessarily aggregate them.  
Therefore, the argument that nonpurchase of insurance is a commer-
cial action is not compelling.  If being uninsured is not part of a 
broader regulated market in payment for health care, then we need to 
consider whether the Commerce Clause might cover the inactivity of 
being uninsured. 
B.  Can the Commerce Power Extend to Inactivity? 
Claiming that commerce power has not previously been used to re-
gulate pure inactivity is only one argument against doing so now.33  Pars-
ing the text of the Commerce Clause is also relevant, starting with the 
word “regulate.”  Some have argued that the meaning of “regulate” was 
historically far more limited than now, signifying only to modulate or 
“make regular” but not the power to ban or mandate commerce.34  
Such anachronistic arguments have not prevailed, however, nor has 
modern constitutional jurisprudence taken them seriously.  Instead, 
countless federal laws prohibit rather than simply regulate harmful 
commerce or mandate measures that improve human welfare related to 
commerce.  Even the very first Congress used its newly minted com-
merce power to build lighthouses,35 although it was later noted that 
“[e]recting lighthouses is not ‘regulating commerce,’ properly and 
strictly speaking.”36  A century and a half later, the Wickard Court re-
minded us that “[t]he stimulation of commerce is a use of the regulato-
ry function quite as definitely as prohibitions or restrictions thereon.”37 
 
33 For more on this argument, see infra note 134 and accompanying text. 
34 See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 101, 112 (2001).  
35 See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 53; see also J. Randy Beck, The New Jurispru-
dence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 617 & n.234.  One 
might counter that the spending power allows lighthouse construction even if the 
commerce power does not, but Congress itself referred to the commerce power at a 
time when the spending power was not thought to extend any further than Congress’s 
regulatory powers.  Id. 
36 22 ANNALS OF CONG. 769 (1811). 
37 317 U.S. at 128. 
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In Wickard, Congress regulated commerce in wheat by limiting con-
sumption of home-grown wheat.38  By the same token, Congress might 
have considered simply barring people from seeking care if they lacked 
insurance.  Rather than adopt a measure so draconian, Congress chose 
to require people to obtain insurance or pay a moderate penalty.  Based 
on plausible meanings of “regulate,” there is no reason why a mandate 
to engage in commerce could not be considered the regulation of 
commerce just as much as a prohibition of commerce.  A mandate may 
be a strong form of regulation, but it is no stronger, in the abstract, 
than a prohibition.  Even if a mandate were the strongest form of reg-
ulation, this would make it more regulatory, not less so.  In the words of 
Chief Justice Marshall, “the power to regulate . . . may be exercised to 
its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are 
prescribed in the constitution.”39 
One attempt to circumvent this argument focuses on the object of 
regulation.  “Commerce” seems to call for some type of action, such as 
manufacture, distribution, or sale.  Because a mandate to purchase 
applies to someone who has not entered into commerce, one might 
argue that such a mandate cannot constitute the regulation of com-
merce; instead, a purchase mandate is the regulation of noncommerce. 
There is discernible logic to this reasoning, but it is not compel-
ling logic.  The clause does not say that action must precede federal 
intervention, only that federal power may be used to regulate some-
thing that can be called commerce.  Insurance is commerce.  To 
mandate the purchase of insurance is, grammatically, just as much the 
regulation of insurance as is a mandate to sell insurance, or a prohibi-
tion on buying insurance.  Commerce clearly includes both the pur-
chase of products and their manufacture and sale.  Because regulation  
includes mandating as well as prohibiting behavior related to prod-
ucts, it follows logically that “regulating commerce” can include man-
dating a purchase. 
Even if this rebuttal is not compelling, the premise of the main 
argument is false.  It is not necessary that “commerce” be the object of 
all regulation under the Commerce Clause.  Instead, under the well-
established “substantial effects” doctrine, Congress may regulate mat-
ters that affect interstate commerce.40  Therefore, in order for the sta-
 
38 Id. 
39 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824). 
40 See, e.g., Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 (“But even if appellee’s activity be local and 
though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be 
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tus of being uninsured to fall entirely outside of the commerce power, 
the Florida court felt it necessary to conclude, starkly, that 
the mere status of being without health insurance, in and of itself, has ab-
solutely no impact whatsoever on interstate commerce (not “slight,” “trivi-
al,” or “indirect,” but no impact whatsoever)—at least not any more so than 
the status of being without any particular good or service.  If impact on  
interstate commerce were to be expressed and calculated mathematically, 
the status of being uninsured would necessarily be represented by zero.  
Of course, any other figure multiplied by zero is also zero.  Consequently, 
the impact must be zero, and of no effect on interstate commerce.
41
 
This startling assertion is true only in a highly constrained, almost tauto-
logical sense:  if one’s concept of causation or attribution insists on 
some initiating action, then, by definition, not spending money can 
never affect commerce.  But of course, not spending money is a major 
driver of economic forces and is as much a matter of market dynamics 
as is spending money.  Certainly, this conception prevails in health pol-
icy circles and in the Congress that enacted PPACA. 
In sum, there is no avoiding the grammatical and conceptual pos-
sibility that the power to regulate commerce could include the power 
to mandate a purchase.  Selling and purchasing are two sides of the 
same transactional coin.  Thus, if insurers can be forced to sell, sub-
scribers can also be forced to buy, and both may be regarded as a uni-
fied regulation of commerce in insurance.  The only remaining argu-
ment is whether this should be allowed or instead forbidden for some 
reason based in constitutional policy or principle. 
C.  Should the Commerce Power Extend to Inactivity? 
One reason to preclude federal regulation of economic inactivity is 
the need for justiciable limits on the commerce power.  As all law stu-
dents well know, ever since the New Deal era the Court has interpreted 
the Commerce Clause so broadly that any limits are hard to discern.42  
Recognizing that Congress’s regulatory authority “is subject to outer 
limits . . . ‘in the light of our dual system of government,’” the Court 
more recently sought principles or concepts to limit the commerce 
 
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate com-
merce . . . .”).  
41 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-0091, 2011 
WL 285683, at *26 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011). 
42 For two reviews of the history, curiously in the same journal with nearly identical 
titles, see Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2010), and Deborah Jones 
Merritt, Commerce!, 94 MICH. L. REV. 674, 674 (1995). 
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power in order that it “‘not be extended so as to . . . effectually oblite-
rate the distinction between what is national and what is local and 
create a completely centralized government.’”43 
Drawing a line at inaction or nonpurchase is one possible limit.  
An advantage of this line might be simply its discernability.  But how 
serviceable is the line in actuality?  In prior eras, the Court abandoned 
attempts to categorically distinguish trade from manufacturing,44 direct 
from indirect effects on commerce,45 and goods flowing in commerce 
from goods that have left or not yet entered the stream of commerce.46  
Each of these lines proved to be unworkable.47  Would the action/ 
inaction distinction prove to be any more successful?  In a different 
health care context, Justice Scalia warned us: 
It would not make much sense to say that one may not kill oneself by 
walking into the sea, but may sit on the beach until submerged by the in-
coming tide; or that one may not intentionally lock oneself into a cold 
storage locker, but may refrain from coming indoors when the tempera-
ture drops below freezing.  Even as a legislative matter, in other words, 
the intelligent line does not fall between action and inaction . . . .
48
 
 
43 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995) (quoting NLRB v. Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)). 
44 See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276-77 (1918) (holding that Congress 
could not limit intrastate transportation of goods manufactured using child labor), 
overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).  
45 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935), 
limited by NLRB, 301 U.S. 1, and Wickard, 317 U.S. 111. 
46 See id. at 543 (“The mere fact that there may be a constant flow of commodities 
into a State does not mean that the flow continues after the property has ar-
rived . . . .”); see also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 304 (1936) (noting that 
labor and other “antecedents of production” do not constitute a “transaction 
in . . . interstate commerce”), limited by Darby, 312 U.S. 100. 
47 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556 (noting that prior distinctions “artificially had con-
strained the authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce”).  See generally Bar-
ry Cushman, Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1089, 1093 (2000). 
48 Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296 (1990) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring); see also Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1213 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) 
(“[I]t is possible to restate most actions as corresponding inactions with the same effect, 
and to show that inaction may have the same effects as a forbidden action.”); PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 374 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 
1984) (“Failure to blow a whistle or to shut off steam, although in itself inaction, is rea-
dily treated as negligent operation of a train, which is affirmative misconduct . . . .” 
(footnote omitted)).  For a philosophical critique of the action/inaction distinction, see 
generally JONATHAN BENNETT, THE ACT ITSELF (1995).  For a legal critique, see Ernest J. 
Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247, 247-48 (1980). 
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Nevertheless, as Justice Scalia acknowledged, the law often does 
draw a line between action and inaction when there is good reason to 
do so.  But then who should judge how to draw the line that defines 
pure inaction?  As explained above, a reasoned case can be made that 
being uninsured entails the action of deciding to pay for care out of 
pocket or with the help of charity.  A deferential court would honor 
reasonable legislative judgments about when economic activity is 
present. 
An activist court could, however, enforce an action/inaction line 
here.  But why should it?  Does the active/passive line cohere with the 
theory, text, history, or doctrine that grants Congress authority over 
interstate commerce in the first place?  This is a sweeping question, 
which allows for only a sketch of an answer here. 
The failure to obtain insurance almost certainly would not fall 
within the original meaning of commerce,49 but then neither might 
many other areas that Congress now regulates, with explicit Supreme 
Court endorsement.50  Despite the threat of federal power run amok, 
reversion to the Constitution’s original meaning of interstate commerce 
is beyond almost any jurist’s or scholar’s contemplation.  Doing that 
would reverse generations, if not centuries, of established precedent 
and undo critical and firmly ensconced regulatory regimes, including 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency, and the Drug Enforcement Agency. 
But preventing Congress from going any further is much easier to 
contemplate than rolling back the tide of seventy-five years or more of 
history.  Critical, then, is whether the action/inaction line has policy 
relevance to the core structural function the Commerce Clause serves.  
The clause’s core purpose prompted the Court to bar application of 
the commerce power to local, noneconomic domains that fall within 
 
49 See Robert G. Natelson & David B. Kopel, A “Health Laws of Every Description”:  
John Marshall’s Ruling on a Federal Health Care Law, ENGAGE (forthcoming Apr. 2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1751711 (authoring a fictional opinion in Chief 
Justice Marshall’s voice that finds PPACA unconstitutional). 
50 See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010) (“‘The Federal Gov-
ernment undertakes activities today that would have been unimaginable to the Framers 
in two senses; first, because the Framers would not have conceived that any government 
would conduct such activities . . . . Yet the powers conferred upon the Federal Govern-
ment by the Constitution were phrased in language broad enough to allow for the ex-
pansion of the Federal Government’s role.’” (quoting New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 157 (1992))); accord Barnett, supra note 34, at 104 n.26 (“[E]ven the broadest 
original meaning of the Commerce Clause that can be justified historically is still far nar-
rower than the power the Supreme Court currently allows Congress to exercise.”). 
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the traditional realm of state police power.51  Mandating health insur-
ance is miles from crossing those outer bounds.  Setting tighter boun-
daries according to action versus inaction would have little to do with 
the federalism concerns underlying the granting of commerce power.  
The passivity of decisions not to purchase does not rob them of their 
inherently economic nature, especially when considering the nonpur-
chase of insurance, which is a quintessentially economic product.  
Moreover, a matter is not more or less a subject of state police power 
because it involves action or inaction.  After all, an unqualified pur-
chase mandate is as rare in state law as it is in federal law.52 
In limiting the reach of the commerce power, the Court’s express 
objective is to avoid overtaking all of the states’ police powers.  In con-
trast, the desire to protect individual rights is what motivates challenges 
against the insurance mandate.  As the Eastern District of Virginia can-
didly expressed:  “At its core, this dispute is . . . about an individual’s 
right to choose” to be uninsured.53  But, as the Florida court correctly 
held, there is no constitutionally protected individual right to be left 
entirely alone by the government or to spend or save one’s money en-
tirely as one pleases.54  Courts could construct radically new (or reactio-
nary) jurisprudence along such lines, using the Ninth Amendment for 
instance,55 but nothing in existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence ex-
presses special solicitude toward individual liberties simpliciter. 
 
51 The leading examples are gun possession near schools and violence against 
women.  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000) (rejecting Con-
gress’s attempt to use the Commerce Clause to create federal civil causes of action for 
violence against women); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (holding that regulating gun posses-
sion near schools exceeds Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause). 
52 See Peter J. Smith, Federalism, Lochner, and the Individual Mandate 16-17 (George 
Washington Univ. Law Sch., Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 534, 2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1777208 (explaining why the inactivity distinc-
tion is not one “that anyone genuinely interested in formulating sensible and coherent 
rules of federalism . . . would naturally propose.  The fact that the regulated matter is 
more aptly characterized as passive rather than active bears no relationship at all to the 
things that matter in determining whether the federal government or instead the states 
ought to be the presumptive or exclusive regulator.” (emphasis omitted)). 
53 Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 788 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
54 See Florida ex rel. McCollum v. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 
1120, 1146 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (rejecting claims that PPACA unconstitutionally infringes 
on the right to spend money as one wishes); see also Mark A. Hall, Individual Versus State 
Constitutional Rights Under Health Care Reform, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1233, 1235 (2011) 
(“[T]here is no constitutional basis for an individually-protected liberty interest to 
avoid buying health insurance.”); sources cited supra note 2. 
55 See infra notes 152-57 and accompanying text. 
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D.  The Slippery Slope Problem 
No matter which view courts take, they lack binding precedent.  
The Supreme Court has never expressly validated or prohibited Com-
merce Clause regulation of pure inactivity.  The constitutional text 
could be read either way, but following the modern development of 
the federal commerce power, allowing this form of regulation is more 
principled than forbidding it.  Some limit on the commerce power is 
necessary, and more limits might be desirable, but that does not mean 
that limits should be set willy-nilly.  The opportunity to set this particu-
lar limit exists mainly because it has not previously been addressed.  
That is more an accident of history than a creature of logic.56 
Despite these objections, a court motivated to find limits could 
plausibly erect an inactivity fence.  Doing so would address the slip-
pery slope arguments that, without such a limit, the Commerce Clause 
absurdly or outrageously could be invoked to mandate the purchase 
of American cars in order to create jobs, or to mandate health-club 
memberships to promote worker productivity.  Without any discerni-
ble conceptual boundaries on the types of products whose purchase 
might be mandated, defenders of this power can only resort to the po-
litical process to set limits.  At one point, the Court appeared content 
to leave commerce power limits largely to political constraints,57 but 
more recently it has reemphasized the judicial role in defining and 
policing those limits.58 
 
56 Mocking this point, Andrew Koppelman writes:  “The scholarly argument against 
the mandate pretty much runs this way:  (1) There must be some limit on federal power; 
(2) I can’t think of another one; and therefore, (3) the limit must preclude the indi-
vidual mandate.”  Koppelman, supra note 2, at 18.  He goes on to say, 
It’s actually very easy to think of other ones. . . . [For instance,] Congress can-
not enact any legislation that requires the use of instrumentalities that begin 
with the letter J.  Congress cannot enact any legislation that calls for enforce-
ment on Tuesdays.  Congress cannot choose any means that weighs more than 
346 pounds.  All of these would drive back the specter of unlimited Congres-
sional power.  The only problem with them is that they are silly and have noth-
ing to do with the underlying reasons for wanting to have limited but effective 
federal power in the first place.  The activity/inactivity distinction has the 
same problem. 
Id. at 18 n.42. 
57 See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556-57 (1985) 
(holding that the political process insulates states from burdensome federal regulation 
of their internal functions). 
58 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613-14 (2000) (noting that 
“‘[w]hether particular operations affect interstate commerece sufficiently to come un-
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How tightly the courts should police the commerce power depends 
in part on the risk of abuse.  Any government power can be taken to the 
extreme, and opponents of particular measures are never short on out-
landish hypothetical extensions.  Two centuries ago, defenders of states’ 
rights worried that the federal power “[t]o establish . . . post [r]oads”59 
could be abused to allow federal takeover of state highways, so they ar-
gued for limiting federal authority to only the designation of existing 
roads for postal routes, rather than the construction of new roads.60  
Today, should we take any more seriously the speculation that uphold-
ing the individual mandate could permit a federal requirement to, for 
instance, own a General Motors car?61  One could equally worry that 
Michigan might do the same under its general police power.62  Noting 
ridiculous possibilities like these has seldom been enough in and of it-
self to preclude otherwise lawful exercises of the full extent of well-
justified government powers.  But that begs the question of how well-
justified the individual mandate is.  Therefore, I return to this slippery 
slope concern at the end of this Article, after more fully reviewing the 
extent of federal authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
II.  NAVIGATING THE NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE 
Reasonable positions can be articulated on both sides of whether 
mandating insurance regulates activity and whether the Commerce 
Clause permits regulation of inactivity.  But even conceding for the sake 
of argument that the Commerce Clause might not by itself support 
compulsory health insurance, that is hardly the end of the inquiry.  The 
Constitution also gives Congress authority “To make all Laws which 
 
der’” the commerce power “‘is ultimately a judicial rather than a legislative question’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 n.2 (1995))). 
59 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
60 For more on this fascinating history, see 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1123-1142 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & 
Co. 1833), LINDSAY ROGERS, THE POSTAL POWER OF CONGRESS:  A STUDY IN CONSTITU-
TIONAL EXPANSION (1916), and Project:  Post Office, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 643 (1968).   
61 See Randy Barnett, A Noxious Commandment, NYTIMES.COM ROOM FOR DEBATE 
(Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2010/12/13/a-fatal-blow-
to-obamas-health-care-law/an-unconstitutional-commandment (arguing that uphold-
ing the insurance mandate could permit a General Motors mandate).  
62 This insight comes from Orin Kerr, Two Variations on “Could the Government Make 
You Buy a GM Car?,” VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 17, 2010, 6:15 PM), http://volokh.com/ 
2010/12/17/two-variations-on-could-the-government-make-you-buy-a-gm-car.  Kerr also 
posits that the unquestioned scope of the conventional federal commerce power over 
channels of interstate commerce might be used to permit only General Motors cars to 
cross state lines on U.S. highways.  Id. 
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shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution . . . all other 
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States.”63  This clause forms the basis, for instance, of federal criminal 
laws, since the Constitution does not expressly confer congressional 
power to create and punish most federal crimes.  The Court’s 2010 de-
cision in United States v. Comstock went even further, holding that the 
Necessary and Proper Clause also supports involuntary civil confine-
ment of federal prisoners for psychiatric treatment even after they have 
fully served their criminal sentences.64  Despite the lack of a general 
federal police power over civil commitment, involuntary treatment was 
ruled necessary and proper to Congress’s implied authority to punish 
crimes relating to interstate commerce.65 
Similarly, it appears inescapable that compulsory insurance is ne-
cessary and proper in the particular context of PPACA to achieve Con-
gress’s regulatory goal of requiring health insurers to accept all appli-
cants regardless of health condition.  The Commerce Clause clearly 
gives Congress authority to impose a “guarantee issue” requirement 
on insurers, and none of the leading lawsuits claim otherwise.66  Also, 
there is no substantial dispute that this fundamental improvement in 
health insurance products and markets cannot be effectively accom-
plished without an accompanying coverage mandate.  Otherwise, many 
people would simply wait to purchase insurance until they needed care.  
This “adverse selection” would force the price of insurance higher for 
sick people who want to maintain continuous coverage, thus making  
insurance even more unaffordable than it is currently, and leading 
more people to drop insurance even when they feel that they need it.67 
Challengers appear to concede this factual point,68 which is amply 
documented in congressional hearings and health policy literature.69  
 
63 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
64 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010). 
65 Id. 
66 The definitive case is United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 
533, 552-53 (1944), which is discussed in the text accompanying infra note 86. 
67 See Hall, supra note 12 (manuscript at 9-17).   
68 One challenger who does not is Jonathan Adler; however, his argument only 
reinforces the mandate’s necessity by claiming that the current mandate is too weak to 
work effectively.  See Jonathan H. Adler, Is the Individual Mandate “Necessary”?, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Oct. 14, 2010, 11:08 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/10/14/is-the-
individual-mandate-necessary.   
69 For example, adverse selection was a topic in Senate hearings on health care 
reform: 
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Indeed, this market-crippling threat has already borne out under 
PPACA.  Three years prior to the individual mandate, early regula-
tions required insurers to accept all children under age nineteen re-
gardless of preexisting conditions.  Fearing adverse selection, most 
major insurers immediately stopped selling child-only coverage.70  This 
confirms what the challengers themselves assert, and the Florida court 
ruled that compulsory insurance is the “keystone or lynchpin of the 
entire health reform effort”71—meaning that much of the rest of the 
reform could collapse without it.  Thus, the Florida court’s remedy 
was to invalidate all of the Act, including major parts that are clearly 
constitutional, based on finding that “the individual mandate is indis-
putably necessary to PPACA’s insurance market reforms, which are, in 
turn, indisputably necessary to the purpose of the Act.”72  This sweep-
ing remedy recognizes the market havoc that would likely ensue from 
simply striking the mandate in isolation while leaving the insurance 
regulations in place.  Hence, this remedy essentially concedes the 
mandate’s necessary role in accomplishing the core parts of PPACA 
that are constitutionally unchallenged. 
This Part reviews arguments challengers raise to avoid this see-
mingly unavoidable conclusion.  Entering yet another doctrinal and 
conceptual maze, this time challengers’ arguments are clearly blocked 
at each turn.  Thus, although the Commerce Clause arguments for re-
jecting the mandate have an uncertain outcome, there is no plausible 
path of reasoning under the Necessary and Proper Clause that would 
 
Such an approach [of requiring insurers to cover everyone without requiring 
people to purchase] would invite egregious adverse risk selection on the part 
of the insured, who could afford to go without insurance when healthy in the 
comfort of knowing that they are entitled to health insurance at a community-
rated premium when sick.  As every economist and actuary appreciates, this 
type of adverse risk selection ultimately leads to the so-called “death spiral” of 
the community-rated risk pools. 
Health Care Reform:  An Economic Perspective:  Hearing Before the S. Fin. Comm., 110th Cong. 
61 (2008) (statement of Uwe Reinhardt, Professor, Woodrow Wilson School of Public 
and International Affairs, Princeton University). 
70 See Janet Adamy & Avery Johnson, White House Denies Rate Hikes to Private Medi-
care Plans, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2010, at A7 (describing companies’ moves to drop 
child-only policies and criticism of this move). 
71 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-0091, 2011 
WL 285683, at *35 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).  As the court elaborated, “this Act has 
been analogized to a finely crafted watch, and that seems to fit.  It has approximately 
450 separate pieces, but one essential piece (the individual mandate) is defective and 
must be removed.  It cannot function as originally designed.”  Id. at *39. 
72 Id. at *37. 
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produce a coherent basis for rejecting the mandate.73  To demonstrate 
this, I first turn to the governing concept of “necessity.” 
A.  Is the Mandate “Necessary” Enough? 
Case law and commentators debate the degree of necessity that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause requires.  Regardless, the empirical 
evidence briefly surveyed above establishes that the mandate easily 
meets any plausible stringency of “necessity.”  No one insists that a 
measure be absolutely essential;74 such a requirement would hamstring 
government too much even for many libertarians and would lead to 
logical absurdities.75  Almost two centuries of precedents have con-
strued “necessary” quite broadly, as meaning merely “‘convenient, or 
useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise’”76 of a 
constitutionally recognized power.  This looser construction is much 
like the meaning of necessary in the familiar insurance construct 
“medically necessary,” which generally means medically appropriate 
rather than absolutely essential to life or limb.77  The Court’s recent 
decision in United States v. Comstock specified that necessary measures 
 
73 For one failed attempt, see George F. Will, Op-Ed., The Supreme Court and the Health-
Care Mandate Muddle, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/11/AR2011031105815.html. 
74 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413 (1819) (concluding 
“necessary” does not mean an absolute necessity such that the one thing “cannot exist 
without the other”). 
75 For instance, government would be prohibited from doing anything, even in the 
most critical situations, any time that it had more than one option available, because if 
“various systems might be adopted for [a] purpose, it might be said with respect to each, 
that it was not necessary because the end might be obtained by other means.”  United 
States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1805).  As Justice Story illustrated, 
For instance, Congress possesses the power to make war and to raise armies, 
and, incidentally to erect fortifications, and purchase cannon and ammuni-
tion, and other munitions of war.  But war may be carried on without fortifica-
tions, cannon, and ammunition.  No particular kind of arms, can be shown to 
be absolutely necessary; because various sorts of arms of different conveni-
ence, power, and utility, are or may be resorted to by different nations.  What 
then becomes of the power? 
3 STORY, supra note 60, § 1240. 
76 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (quoting McCulloch, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 413, 418). 
77 See generally Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers’ Assessment of 
Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1638 n.4 (1992) (explaining various mean-
ings of the term “medically necessary”).  
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need only be “rationally related” to a constitutional power.78  Notably, 
Chief Justice Roberts joined this majority opinion.  Concurring Justic-
es Alito and Kennedy wrote separately to object to this loose standard 
but called only for the somewhat stiffer necessity standards of “a sub-
stantial link”79 and “a tangible link to commerce . . . based on empirical 
demonstration.”80  The individual mandate easily meets these tests81 as 
an integral and essential component of Congress’s comprehensive 
regulation of health insurance products and markets. 
The mandate’s necessity might overcome even the objections of 
the two dissenters in Comstock, Justices Thomas and Scalia.  Their opi-
nion noted that the “Government identifies no specific enumerated 
power or powers as a constitutional predicate” for the federal power in 
question—civil commitment of mentally ill prisoners who had served 
their full sentences.82  The dissenters objected that this law was several 
steps removed from the originating congressional power to regulate 
commerce.  The crimes in question related to child pornography, 
which is often (but not always) transmitted across state lines.  Federal 
imprisonment is a necessary and proper means to punish these crimes.  
Civil commitment is further necessary because uprooting mentally ill 
and sexually dangerous prisoners makes either local or home states re-
luctant to take jurisdiction once these prisoners are released.  Accor-
dingly, once criminal confinement ceases, civil commitment is at least 
two steps removed from the base commerce power.83 
No such separation exists for compulsory health insurance. The 
mandate is the tails side of the single insurance-regulation coin PPACA 
minted.  Some might argue that the heads side itself relies on the Ne-
cessary and Proper Clause in order to reach insurance that is not sold 
across state lines.84  But that is not the modern test for the Commerce 
 
78 130 S. Ct. at 1956.  As the Court elaborated:  “‘If it can be seen that the means 
adopted are really calculated to attain the end, the degree of their necessity, the extent 
to which they conduce to the end, the closeness of the relationship between the means 
adopted and the end to be attained, are matters for congressional determination 
alone.’”  Id. at 1957 (quoting Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 547-48 (1934)). 
79 Id. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring). 
80 Id. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
81 See generally Ilya Somin, Taking Stock of Comstock:  The Necessary and Proper Clause 
and the Limits of Federal Power, 2009–2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 239, 239 (critiquing Coms-
tock for setting few limits on Congress’s use of the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
82 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1973 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
83 See Somin, supra note 81, at 247-48 (explaining the reasoning of Justice Tho-
mas’s dissent). 
84 The reasoning of this argument is suggested by Justice Scalia’s notable concur-
rence in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 35 (2005), which upheld federal authority to 
HALL REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2011  1:56 PM 
2011] Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform 1845 
Clause’s scope.  Instead, all health insurance easily fits within the core 
of modern commerce power because it substantially affects regional 
and national markets in many obvious ways. 
Moreover, major aspects of health insurance are not local at all.  
Even though regulated locally and populated by local subsidiaries, the 
insurance markets in many states are dominated by insurers owned by 
large national firms.85  Consequently, as the Supreme Court explained 
in the definitive case, “no modern commercial enterprise directly af-
fects so many persons in all walks of life as does the insurance busi-
ness.”86  Much of PPACA’s reach then is within the actual flow of inter-
state commerce. 
Even if this were not the case, both the majority in Comstock and 
Justice Kennedy in his concurrence squarely rejected the premise of  
Justices Scalia and Thomas’s dissenting opinion.87  The majority 
( joined by Chief Justice Roberts) stated that it is “irreconcilable” with 
precedent to argue “that, when legislating pursuant to the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, Congress’ authority can be no more than one step 
removed from a specifically enumerated power.”88  The Court stressed 
this point at some length, referencing Greenwood v. United States, a case 
that upheld the civil commitment of a mentally incompetent defen-
dant accused of robbing a post office.89 
 
prohibit marijuana grown at home with local seeds and used only for personal con-
sumption.  The majority relied only on the Commerce Clause, noting the potential 
effects home-grown crops can have on national markets.  Id. at 18-19 (majority opi-
nion).  Justice Scalia, instead, relied on the Necessary and Proper Clause to extend 
commerce power over purely local crops.  Id. at 34-35 (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment).  Several commentators urge the Court to generalize this reasoning to other 
or all applications of the “substantial effects” branch of the commerce power.  See, e.g., 
Barnett, supra note 13, at 592-93 (“The doctrine allowing Congress to regulate inter-
state activity that substantially affects interstate commerce . . . defines the scope of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.”); John T. Valauri, The Clothes Have No Emperor, or, Cabin-
ing the Commerce Clause, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 405, 408-09 (2004) (arguing that the en-
tire substantial effects prong of the Commerce Clause doctrine must be founded on 
the Necessary and Proper Clause). 
85 See D. ANDREW AUSTIN & THOMAS L. HUNGERFORD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R40834, THE MARKET STRUCTURE OF THE HEALTH INSURANCE INDUSTRY 27-29 (2009); 
James C. Robinson, Consolidation and the Transformation of Competition in Health Insur-
ance, HEALTH AFF., Nov.–Dec. 2004, at 11, 11-12. 
86 United States v. Se. Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 540 (1944). 
87 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1963; see also id. at 1965-66 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (re-
jecting the argument that “congressional authority under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause can be no more than one step removed from an enumerated power”). 
88 Id. at 1963 (majority opinion). 
89 350 U.S. 366, 369, 375 (1956). 
HALL REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2011  1:56 PM 
1846 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 1825 
The underlying enumerated Article I power was the power to “Establish 
Post Offices and Post Roads.”  But, as Chief Justice Marshall recognized 
in McCulloch, 
“the power ‘to establish post offices and post roads’ . . . is executed 
by the single act of making the establishment . . . . [F]rom this has 
been inferred the power and duty of carrying the mail along the post 
road, from one post office to another.  And, from this implied power, 
has again been inferred the right to punish those who steal letters 
from the post office, or rob the mail.” 
And, as we have explained, from the implied power to punish we have 
further inferred both the power to imprison and, in Greenwood, the feder-
al civil-commitment power. 
 Our necessary and proper jurisprudence contains multiple examples 
of similar reasoning. 
 . . . Thus, we must reject respondents’ argument that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause permits no more than a single step between an enu-
merated power and an Act of Congress.
90
 
B.  Does the Mandate “Carry into Execution”  
PPACA’s Insurance Regulations? 
To avoid the force of these precedents, some challengers have  
developed an inventive argument that court decisions so far have not 
explicitly addressed:  although the insurance mandate obviously relates 
in some way to Congress’s power to regulate insurers, it does not  
“carry[] into Execution”91 that power.92  Instead, Congress attempted 
to exercise an independent power to regulate individuals.  The Neces-
sary and Proper Clause authorizes only the implementation of express 
powers, and so the argument goes, the clause does not support new 
 
90 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1963-64 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) 
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7, and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 
316, 417 (1819)). 
91 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
92 The argument is hinted at by Judge Henry E. Hudson’s inscrutable reasoning 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause “may only be constitutionally deployed when te-
thered to a lawful exercise of an enumerated power. . . . The [individual mandate] is 
neither within the letter nor the spirit of the Constitution.  Therefore, the Necessary 
and Proper Clause may not be employed to implement this affirmative duty to engage 
in private commerce.”  Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 782 
(E.D. Va. 2010); see also Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
No. 10-0091, 2011 WL 285683, at *30 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011) (explaining that the 
clause “is not an independent source of federal power; rather, it is simply ‘a caveat that 
the Congress possesses all the means necessary to . . . carry[] into execution those 
(powers) otherwise granted’” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kinsella v. 
United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 247 (1960))). 
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powers that pursue separate goals.  PPACA, it is argued, has at least two 
separate goals:  making everyone eligible for full coverage and covering 
as many people as possible.  Insurance regulation accomplishes the first 
goal, while the individual mandate pursues the second.  The two may 
be related, but challengers insist that the mandate is not subsidiary to 
insurance regulation and that it does more than merely execute or 
implement insurance regulation.93 
Early interpretations of the clause suggest this narrow focus on the 
“execution” of enumerated powers.  Founding-era and early nineteenth-
century courts and commentators cautiously described only very nar-
row extensions of express powers as being necessary and proper-–
extensions that today would easily be seen simply as direct exercises of 
the express powers that do not require an extender clause.  For in-
stance, building a post office was viewed as a necessary extension of 
the express postal power,94 and arming and supporting an army was 
seen as necessary to carrying out the war power.95  In contrast, follow-
ing the Civil War, the Court initially ruled (but then quickly reversed 
itself) that declaring paper money to be legal tender does not execute 
the power either to coin or to borrow money.96 
Justices Thomas and Scalia attempted to revive a similarly narrow 
construction in their dissent to the Court’s recent Comstock decision, 
where they stated that “no matter how ‘necessary’ or ‘proper’ an Act 
of Congress may be to its objective, Congress lacks authority to legis-
late if the objective is anything other than ‘carrying into Execution’ 
one or more of the Federal Government’s enumerated powers.”97  The 
Necessary and Proper Clause has not been read so narrowly, howev-
 
93 Brief of House Republican Leader John Boehner as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 8-13, Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No 10-0091 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011), ECF No. 119, 
available at http://aca-litigation.wikispaces.com/file/view/Boehner+amicus.pdf. 
94 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 417 (“Take, for example, the power ‘to es-
tablish post offices and post roads.’  This power is executed by the single act of making 
the establishment.”). 
95 3 STORY, supra note 60, § 1174 (“The power to raise armies is an indispensable 
incident to the power to declare war . . . .”). 
96 Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 625 (1869), overruled by Legal Ten-
der Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).  The Hepburn Court reasoned that coinage 
does not refer to paper, and the government can raise funds by issuing paper currency 
without also having to declare it to be legal tender.  75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 607-08.  A year 
later, the Legal Tender Cases held that this reasoning is obviously too restrictive and con-
trary to McCulloch.  79 U.S. (12 Wall.) at 534-38. 
97 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1972 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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er.98  Consider, for instance, the postal power.  Based solely on the ex-
press authority “to establish Post Offices and post Roads,”99 the Court 
has upheld as necessary and proper the unexpressed federal powers to 
create an exclusive government monopoly in the delivery of letters,100 
to forbid delivery of morally offensive items (such as obscene mate-
rials or those that advertise lotteries), and to enforce a host of crimi-
nal statutes related to the mail.101   
Of late, the Comstock decision ruled that committing prisoners for 
involuntary mental treatment is a proper extension of Congress’s au-
thority to punish federal crimes, even when the commitment occurs 
only after prisoners have completed serving their sentences.102  In 
doing so, the Court implicitly rejected passing language from its deci-
sion half a century ago in Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton.103  
This is the same language that both the overturned court of appeals 
and the dissenting Supreme Court opinions in Comstock cited or 
quoted.104  In Kinsella, the Court reasoned that the Necessary and 
Proper Clause is “not itself a grant of power, but a caveat that the Con-
gress possesses all the means necessary to carry out the specifically 
granted ‘foregoing’ powers.”105  However, this is loose language106 that 
the Court has never since repeated.107 
 
98 See David G. Wille, The Commerce Clause:  A Time for Reevaluation, 70 TUL. L. REV. 
1069, 1087 (1996) (“[Reid and Kinsella] cannot be reconciled with the Supreme 
Court’s current interpretation of the Commerce Clause as expanded by the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.”). 
99 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7. 
100 Brennan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 439 U.S. 1345, 1346-47 (1978) (Marshall, J., in 
chambers) (denying a request for a stay filed by litigants challenging the constitutio-
nality of granting the United States Postal Service “a monopoly over the conveyance of 
letter mail”).  
101 See ROGERS, supra note 60; Project:  Post Office, supra note 60, at 689-702 (detail-
ing classes of “non-mailable” material and describing the function of mail fraud sta-
tutes).  Postal regulations also prescribe acceptable forms of mailboxes attached to pri-
vate homes and forbid placing nonposted materials in home mailboxes, all without 
provoking constitutional objection.  See Residential Mailbox Standards, U.S. POSTAL SER-
VICE, http://www.usps.com/receive/mailboxstandards.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). 
102 130 S. Ct. at 1954. 
103 361 U.S. 234 (1960). 
104 See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1972 (Thomas, J., dissenting); United States v. Com-
stock, 551 F.3d 274, 280-81 (4th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010). 
105 361 U.S. at 247.   
106 This statement accords with other decisions only if one assumes the Court 
meant that the clause is not a freestanding grant of power but one that depends on 
extended powers being connected to an enumerated power.  See, e.g., Comstock, 130 S. 
Ct. at 1972 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (explaining shortly before citing Kinsella that “Fed-
eralist supporters of the Constitution . . . [believed] that the Clause did not grant Con-
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This understanding is borne out in multiple Supreme Court deci-
sions over the past two centuries, starting with McCulloch v. Maryland, in 
which Chief Justice Marshall emphasized at length that the “terms [of 
the Necessary and Proper Clause] purport to enlarge, not to diminish, 
the powers vested in the government. It purports to be an additional 
power . . . .”108  Justice Scalia, in his influential Raich concurrence, con-
firmed that the clause “empowers Congress to enact laws . . . that are 
 
gress any freestanding authority” and that “our precedents uniformly have maintained 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause is not an independent fount of congressional au-
thority” (emphasis added)). 
 Kinsella can also be reconciled with other, apparently contrary, precedents by viewing 
it as an implicit application of the “impropriety” constraint explained below in subsection 
II.C.1.  That side constraint applies only in special circumstances where powers impinge 
on states’ rights or individual rights.  Kinsella addressed military court jurisdiction over 
crimes by civilians, which obviously implicates both sets of rights and thus justifies stricter 
scrutiny of necessity.  361 U.S. at 235.  Thus, as Professor Wille explains,  
 The Kinsella holding contradicts the current interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause in several respects.  The quoted passage establishes that for an exercise 
of power to be valid, the power must be an enumerated one. . . . [This] inter-
pretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause was distinguished from McCul-
loch, because in McCulloch, no specific restraints on governmental power stood 
in the way. 
Wille, supra note 98, at 1086-87. 
107 The Court also used restrictive language a century ago in Kansas v. Colorado, 
206 U.S. 46, 88 (1907), stating that this clause “is not the delegation of a new and in-
dependent power.”  That case refused to let the federal government intervene in a dis-
pute between states over riparian rights in the nonnavigable Arkansas River.  Id. at 117.  
The Court stressed “independent,” since the principal holding was that the federal 
government’s land use powers extend only to navigable waterways, and thus there was 
no enumerated basis on which the government might seek to intervene.  Id. at 86.  
Moreover, in Kansas v. Colorado the government had not in fact legislated or attempted 
to regulate nonnavigable water rights.  Id. at 85-87.  Therefore, the decision is more in 
the nature of a “Dormant Commerce Clause” analysis—which attempts to preclude 
state jurisdiction over a matter that federal authority inherently controls—rather than 
a case that decides what Congress may actively regulate.  See A. Dan Tarlock, The Strange 
Career of the Dormant Commerce Clause and International Trade Law in the Great Lakes Anti-
Diversion Regime, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1375, 1382-83.  The Necessary and Proper 
Clause has never been explicitly used to expand dormant federal powers.  See generally 
Cushman, supra note 47, at 1137-50 (discussing divergence between active and Dor-
mant Commerce Clause lines of cases). 
108 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420 (1819).  Although Justice Marshall noted that the 
“power of creating a corporation is never used for its own sake, but for the purpose of 
effecting something else,” id. at 411, he did not limit the scope of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to pure means without any substantive ends.  Instead, he presented this 
characterization of corporations to explain why the Constitution does not expressly 
enumerate an incorporation power and therefore why its omission from the text does 
not signal an intent to preclude it.  
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not within its authority to enact in isolation.”109  This empowering read-
ing fully accords with the wording of the Tenth Amendment, which the 
Founders debated explicitly in terms of whether Congress can exercise 
only powers “expressly” conferred, as the Articles of Confederation had 
said,110 or instead whether the Necessary and Proper Clause permits ad-
ditional, unexpressed powers.111  By avoiding the use of “expressly dele-
gated,” the Tenth Amendment provides both textual and historical 
support for the accepted reading that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
has this broader, empowering scope.   
Both this long list of examples and the phrasing used to justify these 
outcomes preclude any attempt to restrict the Necessary and Proper 
Clause to a narrow and strict implementation of express powers.  The 
Court has repeatedly emphasized Congress’s latitude to determine 
when legislative measures are a necessary means to an end that is clearly 
constitutional.  The Court has never used the possibility that some 
means might themselves be characterized as independent ends to disal-
low those means, as long as their characterization as means is plausible.  
As just noted, the federal government has used the postal power as a 
convenient means to pursue other social ends, yet the Court regards 
this as a perfectly appropriate extension of this power.112  Multiple ex-
amples can be listed under the Commerce Clause as well, including 
laws mandating that private businesses serve customers without regard 
to their race, gender, or disability.113  As the Court held in Heart of Atlan-
ta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 
 That Congress was legislating against moral wrongs in many of these 
areas rendered its enactments no less valid. . . . [T]he disruptive effect that 
racial discrimination has had on commercial intercourse . . . empowered 
Congress to enact appropriate legislation, and, given this basis for the ex-
ercise of its power, Congress was not restricted by the fact that the particu-
lar obstruction to interstate commerce with which it was dealing was also 
deemed a moral and social wrong.
114
 
In sum, there is no jurisprudence or controlling conceptual schema 
that requires legislative measures to be categorized as only ends versus 
 
109 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
110 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. II. 
111 See 3 STORY, supra note 60, § 1900 (discussing the Founders’ debate over the 
Tenth Amendment). 
112 See, e.g., In re Rapier, 143 U.S. 110, 133-35 (1892) (upholding the criminaliza-
tion of mailing advertisements for lotteries that were otherwise legal). 
113 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (2006) (race and gender); id. §§ 12181–
12189 (disability). 
114 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964). 
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only means, or as independent rather than implementation powers.115  
The governing standard is whether the authority in question is reason-
ably needed to make effective use of an express power, subject only to 
the proviso that the express power or declared purpose not be merely a 
pretext for implementing the unenumerated power.116 
PPACA’s structure and content readily support the government’s 
claim that the mandate’s purpose includes enabling the regulation of 
insurers.  The mandate’s expressed purposes include “creating effec-
tive health insurance markets in which improved health insurance 
products that . . . do not exclude coverage of preexisting conditions 
can be sold.”117  As the Florida court emphasized, “the various insur-
ance provisions . . . are the very heart of the Act itself.”118  Requiring 
insurers to accept all applicants regardless of health condition was a 
primary goal throughout the legislative debates,119 and the law accom-
plishes this single goal more than any other.  PPACA makes insurance 
regulation a fait accompli, banning virtually all forms of medical 
screening or exclusions.  As for universal coverage, PPACA falls well 
short of this goal; it reduces the number of uninsured people by only 
a bit more than half, from fifty-four million to a projected twenty-
 
115 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 36 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“[W]here Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of interstate 
commerce, ‘it possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective.’” (emphasis 
added) (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1942))). 
116 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (warning that 
Congress may not, “under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accom-
plishment of objects not entrusted to the government”). 
117 PPACA §§ 1501, 10106, 42 U.S.C.A. § 18091(a)(2)(I) (West Supp. 1B 2010).   
118 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-0091, 2011 
WL 285683, at *36 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011). 
119  See generally TOM DASCHLE WITH DAVID NATHER, GETTING IT DONE:  HOW OB-
AMA AND CONGRESS FINALLY BROKE THE STALEMATE TO MAKE WAY FOR HEALTH CARE 
REFORM (2010); LAWRENCE R. JACOBS & THEDA SKOCPOL, HEALTH CARE REFORM AND 
AMERICAN POLITICS:  WHAT EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW (2010); STAFF OF THE WASH. 
POST, LANDMARK:  THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA’S NEW HEALTH-CARE LAW AND WHAT 
IT MEANS FOR US ALL (2010).  As the Florida court pointedly observed, “In speech af-
ter speech President Obama emphasized that the legislative goal was ‘health insurance 
reform’ and stressed how important it was that Congress fundamentally reform how 
health insurance companies do business, and ‘protect every American from the worst 
practices of the insurance industry.’”  Bondi, 2011 WL 285683, at *36 (quoting Presi-
dent Barack Obama, Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address ( Jan. 
27, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
state-union-address). 
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three million uninsured in 2019.120  The insurance-regulation goal oc-
cupies the first one hundred or so pages of the bill, whereas the 
mandate does not appear until Subtitle F, and its operative provisions 
occupy less than a dozen pages of the mammoth law.121  Clearly, it 
would be absurd to suggest that reforming insurance markets is noth-
ing more than an excuse to mandate coverage.  Absent mere pretext, 
the connection between the two goals is tight enough to easily satisfy 
the precedents applying the Necessary and Proper Clause over the 
past two centuries. 
C.  Is Regulating Inactivity “Proper”? 
1.  In General 
The mandate is constitutionally “necessary” to regulate insurance, 
but is it “proper”?  Few decisions address the meaning of “proper,” so 
challengers see some potential to fortify limits on congressional power 
by giving this term more bite.  To succeed, the challengers must 
ground the basis for impropriety in some other part of the Constitu-
tion.  Instead, the Florida court used “proper” in an apparently self-
referential manner in this key passage: 
 The defendants have asserted again and again that the individual 
mandate is absolutely “necessary” and “essential” for the Act to operate 
as it was intended by Congress.  I accept that it is.  Nevertheless, the indi-
vidual mandate falls outside the boundary of Congress’ Commerce 
Clause authority and cannot be reconciled with a limited government of 
enumerated powers.  By definition, it cannot be “proper.”122 
This reading of the clause renders it a virtual nullity:  necessary 
measures are improper if they are not contained within the Constitu-
tion’s express provisions.  There is no basis in Supreme Court deci-
sions for defining or applying “proper” in this circular and denuding 
fashion.123  Instead, prior decisions give significance to “proper” only 
 
120 See Letter from Douglas E. Elmendorf, Dir., Cong. Budget Office, to Harry 
Reid, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate 8 (Dec. 19, 2009), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ 
ftpdocs/108xx/doc10868/12-19-Reid_Letter_Managers_Correction_Noted.pdf. 
121 Compare PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, tits. I-II, 124 Stat. 119, 130-353 (2010) (to 
be codified as amended in scattered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.) (insurance regu-
lations), with id. §§ 1501–1502, 124 Stat. 242-52 (to be codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. §§ 5000A, 6055, and 42 U.S.C. § 18091) (individual mandate provisions). 
122 2011 WL 285683, at *33 (footnote omitted). 
123 As Professor Koppelman explains, “Try this reasoning in a few other constitu-
tional contexts.  If locking up mail robbers is no part of the operation of a post office, 
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when legislative measures violate a distinct constitutional norm.124  For 
instance, a necessary measure that “commandeers” state government 
violates the system of dual sovereignty “reflected throughout the Consti-
tution’s text.”125  Similarly, the Court has refused to use the Necessary 
and Proper Clause to extend military court jurisdiction to crimes by 
civilians because 
[e]very extension of military jurisdiction is an encroachment on the ju-
risdiction of the civil courts, and, more important, acts as a deprivation 
of the right to jury trial and of other treasured constitutional protec-
tions.  Having run up against the steadfast bulwark of the Bill of Rights, 
 
then an attempt to do that under the Necessary and Proper Clause is equally offensive 
to the Constitution.”  Koppelman, supra note 2, at 10. 
124 See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power:  A Ju-
risdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 323 (1993) (“[A] law 
abridging the freedom of speech . . . [or] imposing a cruel or unusual punish-
ment . . . , although rarely explicitly stated in terms of this language, would be impro-
per.”).  Professors Lawson and Granger argue that “proper” was used in this way even 
before the adoption of the Bill of Rights, and thus the Constitution need not specify 
constitutional side constraints.  Id. at 273.  But they restrict any such unenumerated 
side constraints to well-developed constitutional principles such as separation of pow-
ers, states’ rights, or individual rights.  Id. at 297.   
 Ilya Somin argues that failing to give “proper” more significance than this makes it a 
redundancy, because other constitutional provisions would restrict congressional power 
by their own force.  See Ilya Somin, Charles Fried on the Constitutionality of the Health Care 
Mandate, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 21, 2010, 1:47 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/05/ 
21/charles-fried-on-the-constitutionality-of-the-health-care-mandate.  This argument is 
unconvincing.  The Constitution, like laws generally, uses redundant terms to remind 
and reinforce.  See Akhil Reed Amar, Seegers Lecture, Constitutional Redundancies and 
Clarifying Clauses, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 9 (1998) (“A constitutional clause need not add 
or subtract a new constitutional rule; it is enough if it adds clarity or subtracts confu-
sion.”).  Moreover, without the term “proper,” one may debate whether a necessary 
measure overrides a conflicting provision elsewhere in the Constitution.  Using “prop-
er” to incorporate restrictions elsewhere resolves this uncertainty and gives the term 
independent significance by clarifying that necessary measures do not trump the Bill 
of Rights, for instance.  Finally, Professor Somin’s argument contradicts his own posi-
tion, argued elsewhere, that the Necessary and Proper Clause as a whole does not ex-
pand powers beyond those enumerated.  See Brief of Washington Legal Foundation 
and Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for 
Summary Judgment at 24-25, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 728 
(E.D. Va. 2010) (No. 10-0188), 2010 WL 3952344.  It makes little sense to insist that 
one part of the clause should be given more force while arguing that the clause as a 
whole has essentially no force. 
125 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919, 923-24 (1997) (“When a 
‘La[w] . . . for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce Clause violates the principle of 
state sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional provisions we mentioned earlier, 
it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause[]’ . . . .” 
(alterations in original) (citation omitted)).   
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the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot extend the scope of [the Con-
stitution’s express power over the military].
126
 
This decision explicitly distinguished McCulloch v. Maryland based on 
the fact that “[i]n McCulloch this Court was confronted with the prob-
lem of determining the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause in a 
situation where no specific restraints on governmental power stood in 
the way.”127  The Court explained that “[h]ere the problem is differ-
ent” because “Art. III, § 2 and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments re-
quire that certain express safeguards, which were designed to protect 
persons from oppressive governmental practices, shall be given in 
criminal prosecutions—safeguards which cannot be given in a military 
trial.”128  Based on these express limitations of government powers, 
and not any free-floating propriety concern, the Court concluded that 
“military trial of civilians is inconsistent with both the ‘letter and spirit 
of the constitution.’”129 
Absent overt tension with independent constitutional norms, the 
Supreme Court has regarded “necessary and proper” as a single con-
struct—similar to other compound legal constructs such as “clear and 
convincing,” “cruel and unusual,” and “case or controversy.”130  Thus, 
without an independent source of constitutional impropriety for man-
dating insurance or regulating inactivity, the Court has no grounds on 
which to categorically exclude these measures from the range of pow-
ers that might be necessary to implement other, express constitutional 
powers.131  Generic concerns about expansive federal authority do not 
suffice to declare necessary measures “improper.”  The federal gov-
 
126 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1957).  Reid was also the governing precedent 
for the reasoning and holding in Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 
247 (1960), discussed in the text accompanying supra note 105. 
127 Reid, 354 U.S. at 22. 
128 Id. 
129 Id.; see also Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 621-25 (1869) (holding 
that making paper currency legal tender for existing debts is not “proper” because this 
impairs contracts and might violate due process), overruled by Legal Tender Cases, 79 
U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1870).   
130 For a range of perspectives on the meaning of “proper,” both in judicial deci-
sions and in constitutional theory, see GARY LAWSON ET AL., THE ORIGINS OF THE NE-
CESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE (2010), Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Ne-
cessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 183, 218-20 (2003), J. Randy Beck, The 
New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 632-48, and 
Lawson & Granger, supra note 124, at 285-86, 291-97.   
131 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 36 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judg-
ment) (“[W]here Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of interstate com-
merce, ‘it possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective.’” (quoting 
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118-19 (1942))). 
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ernment has no general police power to commit people for involuntary 
mental treatment, but this is still a proper exercise of federal power 
when necessary to augment the nonenumerated power to confine 
those who commit federal crimes.132  Buying land to build post offices 
or postal roads was once argued to be an improper invasion of state 
jurisdiction, but this has long since been regarded as “[o]ne of the 
best illustrations that we have of the nonsense of which the states-
rights metaphysic was capable.”133 
The strongest argument for a categorical exclusion of mandatory 
purchases is simply that Congress has never before regulated inactivity 
in its purest form under the Commerce Clause.  But, as Justice Story 
explained in his seminal treatise, 
This is clearly what lawyers call a non sequitur.  It might with just as much 
propriety be urged, that, because congress had not hitherto used a par-
ticular means to execute any other given power, therefore it could not 
now do it.  If, for instance, congress had never provided a ship for the 
navy except by purchase, they could not now authorize ships to be built 
for a navy, or à converso. . . . If they had never erected a custom-house, or 
court-house, they could not now do it.  Such a mode of reasoning would 
be deemed by all persons wholly indefensible.
134
 
Excluding inactivity from the Necessary and Proper Clause would 
run afoul of several other instances in which individual mandates have 
long been considered permissible and essential to both the commerce 
power and other express powers that the clause augments.  Even while 
the Constitution was being debated, Alexander Hamilton pointed to 
an implied federal power (known as posse comitatus) to “requir[e] the 
assistance of [ordinary] citizens” in civil law enforcement, which he 
specifically noted was based on the “right to pass all laws necessary and 
proper to execute its declared powers.”135  He stressed that it “would be 
absurd” to think otherwise.136  Just months after the Bill of Rights was 
 
132 See United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1965 (2010).  
133 Edward S. Corwin, Book Review, 10 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 773, 773 (1916) (review-
ing ROGERS, supra note 60). 
134 3 STORY, supra note 60, § 1132. 
135 THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, at 179 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961). 
136 Id.  The first Congress exercised this power in the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 
§ 27, 1 Stat. 73, 87.  This section created a “duty[] of every citizen, when called upon by 
the proper officer, to act as part of the posse comitatus in upholding the laws of his 
country.”  In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535 (1895).  In the Florida litigation, the gov-
ernment argued that this power has been used to enforce a law passed under the 
Commerce Clause, citing President Jefferson’s order to raise a posse in Vermont to 
enforce the Embargo Act.  Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion for Sum-
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ratified, the second Congress adopted the Militia Act of 1792, requir-
ing “every free able-bodied white male citizen” ages eighteen to forty-
five to “provide himself with a good musket or firelock, a sufficient 
bayonet and belt, two spare flints, and a knapsack, a pouch with a box 
therein to contain not less than twenty-four cartridges” at his own ex-
pense in case a need arose to call him into service.137  The Constitu-
tion’s authority “for calling forth the Militia” provides no such express 
power to mandate the private purchase of arms.138  Therefore, this 
purchase mandate must have been based, at least in part, on the Ne-
cessary and Proper Clause.  If a mandate to purchase can augment 
one enumerated federal power, there is no principled reason it can-
not be used to augment the commerce power. 
The Constitution also provides no express federal power of eminent 
domain—a type of forced transaction of longstanding and unques-
tioned legitimacy.139  This power can be inferred, of course, from the 
Fifth Amendment’s proviso that when the state takes property, it must 
pay just compensation.140  But the power has also been upheld as a  
necessary and proper adjunct to the Commerce Clause when used, for 
instance, to mandate the transfer of land for bridges, highways, or  
canals.141  As the Court explained unanimously in one such nineteenth-
century decision, 
 Upon what does the right of Congress to interfere in the matter rest?  
Simply upon the power to regulate commerce. 
 . . . It cannot be doubted, in view of the long list of authorities,—for 
many more might be cited,—that Congress has the power in its discre-
tion to compel the removal of [a] lock and dam as obstructions to the 
navigation of [a] river, or to condemn and take them for the purpose of 
promoting its navigability. 
 
mary Judgment at 32-33, Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human 
Servs., No 10-0091 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011), 2011 WL 4564357.   
137 Ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271, 271.  See generally Bradley Latino, The First Individual 
Mandate:  What the Uniform Militia Act of 1792 Tells Us About Fifth Amendment 
Challenges to Healthcare Reform (July 9, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1624666. 
138 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
139 See generally William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. 
L. REV. 553 (1972).  A “taking” is not the same as a commercial transaction, but it has 
similar elements:  transfer of ownership accompanied by payment of fair market value.  
140 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
141 Lawson & Granger, supra note 124, at 270 & n.9; see also Luxton v. N. River 
Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525, 529-30 (1894) (collecting cases upholding the use of emi-
nent domain as a means of executing Congress’s Commerce Clause authority). 
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 . . . Suppose, in the improvement of a navigable stream, it was 
deemed essential to construct a canal with locks, in order to pass around 
rapids or falls.  Of the power of Congress to [do so] . . . there can be no 
question . . . .
142
 
Even earlier, in colonial times, “there were virtually no limits on 
nonconsensual property transfers between private individuals.  The tak-
ing of land to build dams and private roads and to drain private land 
was commonplace.”143  “[N]umerous colonial statutes authoriz[ed] 
transfers from one private party to another if the original owner failed 
to make productive use of the land. . . . [These forced transfers] were 
intended to advance communities’ needs for economic development 
and population growth.”144  Although the Constitution prohibits such 
forced transfers without compensation and a public purpose, this co-
lonial history reveals that eminent domain powers have long been 
used for purposes related to the Commerce Clause. 
Similarly, federal powers to compel military service and congres-
sional testimony are not expressed in the Constitution, but instead 
have long been supported as necessary and proper extensions of re-
 
142 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 335-37 (1893).  The 
Court’s unanimous twentieth-century decision in Berman v. Parker echoed this point:   
 Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it 
through the exercise of eminent domain is clear.  For the power of eminent 
domain is merely the means to the end. . . . Here one of the means chosen is 
the use of private enterprise for redevelopment of the area.  Appellants argue 
that this makes the project a taking from one businessman for the benefit of 
another businessman.  But the means of executing the project are for Con-
gress and Congress alone to determine, once the public purpose has been es-
tablished.  The public end may be as well or better served through an agency 
of private enterprise than through a department of government—or so the 
Congress might conclude. 
348 U.S. 26, 33-34 (1954) (citations omitted). 
143 Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v. City of New London:  An Argu-
ment for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 500 
(2006) (footnote omitted). 
144 Id. at 502-03.  Dean William Michael Treanor described some of these laws 
from the colonial era: 
Many colonial laws imposed affirmative obligations on residents to use their 
property for some specific purpose to advance the overall interests of the 
community.  A Plymouth colony ordinance required those with rights in valu-
able minerals to exploit their rights or forfeit them.  A Maryland law required 
owners of good mill sites to develop the sites or run the risk of losing their 
property to someone else who would develop the site. 
William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause, GEO. U. L. 
CENTER ENV’T L. PROJECT, 4 (1998), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/current_ 
research/documents/RT_Pubs_Policy_OriginalUnderstandingTakings.pdf. 
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lated war and legislative powers, respectively.145  In exercising its mon-
etary power, Congress may even “‘compel all residents of this country 
to deliver unto the Government all gold bullion, gold coins and gold 
certificates in their possession’” in exchange for equivalent value in 
dollars.146  In modern times, another example of regulating pure inac-
tivity is found in the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).147  Without any constitutional 
objection as yet, Congress, as an exercise of its commerce power, re-
quires that innocent land owners incur the expense of toxic waste 
cleanup, even for wastes they did not cause and knew nothing about 
when they bought the land.148 
The argument here is not that mandating insurance is precisely 
the same as any of these other individual mandates or regulations of 
pure inactivity.  Instead, it is that these other longstanding and unques-
tioned mandates, which are at least partly founded in the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, demonstrate the utter implausibility of arguing 
that regulation of inactivity is somehow categorically improper, or 
even suspect, across the full range of federal powers.  Instead, the 
Court has repeatedly said that “where Congress has the authority to 
enact a regulation of interstate commerce, ‘it possesses every power 
needed to make that regulation effective.’”149 
2.  Individual vs. Sovereign Rights 
We turn, then, to see if there is a textually grounded source of 
constitutional impropriety.  There is no serious argument that the 
Fifth Amendment creates an individually protected right to be unin-
 
145 See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 160, 180 (1927) (holding that leg-
islative subpoena power is a necessary and proper exercise of the Senate’s legislative 
power); Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 385 (1918) (finding that the compul-
sory draft was a necessary and proper exercise of federal power). 
146 Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317, 328 (1935). 
147 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006). 
148 See id. §§ 9606–9607; see also Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 
F.2d 837, 845 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that the property owner’s characterization of his 
own behavior as “active” or “passive” is irrelevant because otherwise, “an owner could 
insulate himself from liability by virtue of his passivity”).  
149 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 36 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118-19 
(1942)); cf. Stoebuck, supra note 139, at 597 (“Eminent domain poses no special threat 
to the individual that would require special limitations on the occasions of its exercise.  
It is not black magic, but merely one of the powers of government, to be used along 
with the other powers as long as some ordinary purpose of government is served.”). 
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sured,150 and most of the leading challenges do not even press this ar-
gument.  Randy Barnett has constructed the best textual argument for 
protecting individual rights.  He points to the Tenth Amendment’s 
reservation of nondelegated powers “to the States respectively, or to the 
people.”151  Creatively, he argues that, just as the Tenth Amendment pro-
tects state sovereignty from federal “commandeering,” the phrase “to 
the people” could be invoked to protect individual sovereignty from 
affronts to liberty that amount to “commandeering the people.”152 
This inventive and entirely unprecedented argument is deeply 
flawed on several levels.153  First, it is essentially a repackaging of Profes-
sor Barnett’s quite similar argument based on the Ninth Amendment’s 
preservation of “rights retained by the people.”154  That route is 
blocked, however, by the refusal of most jurists (including Justice Sca-
lia) to regard the Ninth Amendment as creating unenumerated rights 
that can be judicially protected.155  Moreover, were such rights recog-
nized via the Tenth Amendment, they would obviously constitute a 
federalized version of Lochner that would protect economic liberties 
from congressional, but not state, action.  This form of protection 
would resemble the notion of substantive due process, which Justice 
Scalia156 and others157 oppose for well-known jurisprudential reasons. 
 
150 See Hall, supra note 2, at 45 (“There is no fundamental right to be uninsured.”).  
151 Barnett, supra note 13, at 627 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X). 
152 Id. at 628-30. 
153 See Simon Lazarus, The Health Care Lawsuits:  Unraveling a Century of Constitutional 
Law and the Fabric of Modern American Government, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, 14-17 (Feb. 8, 
2011), http://www.acslaw.org/files/Lazarus%20-%20health%20reform%20lawsuits.pdf 
(criticizing Barnett’s argument for its “Back-door Reinstatement of Activist Substantive 
Due Process”); see also Smith, supra note 52, at 24 (explaining why it would be “doctri-
nally incoherent” to “in effect ask[] the courts to fashion a limitation that sounds in 
personal liberty but that, paradoxically, applies only to action by the federal govern-
ment”).  For an earlier scholar in basic agreement, see David Currie’s discussion of the 
Court’s nineteenth-century Legal Tender Cases, which initially held, but then reversed, 
that laws contrary to the general “spirit” of the Constitution are not “proper.”  DAVID P. 
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT:  THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 
1789–1888, at 321-28 (1985).  In Professor Currie’s estimation, “there are grave objec-
tions to [this] reasoning,” which comes “close to saying all bad laws [are] unconstitu-
tional.”  Id. at 326, 328 n.312.  
154 See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION:  THE PRESUMP-
TION OF LIBERTY 32-35 (2004). 
155 See generally Symposium, The Forgotten Constitutional Amendments, 56 DRAKE L. 
REV. 829 (2008) (debating the Ninth Amendment’s meaning). 
156 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Our opinions applying the doctrine known as ‘substantive due process’ hold 
that . . . only fundamental rights qualify for this so-called ‘heightened scrutiny’ protec-
tion . . . . All other liberty interests may be abridged or abrogated pursuant to a validly 
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Not since the early 1930s has the Court set any limits on the Com-
merce Clause based on protecting individual economic liberty.158  But, 
even for Justices who might be open to doing so, the Tenth Amend-
ment is an inhospitable vehicle because it focuses much more on 
states’ rights than individual rights.  As explained by Justice Scalia’s ma-
jority opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller (the landmark gun-rights 
case), the Tenth Amendment does not refer to individual rights: 
[The First, Fourth and Ninth Amendments] unambiguously refer to in-
dividual rights, not “collective” rights, or rights that may be exercised on-
ly through participation in some corporate body. 
 Three provisions of the Constitution refer to “the people” in a con-
text other than “rights”—the famous preamble (“We the people”), §2 of 
Article I (providing that “the people” will choose members of the 
House), and the Tenth Amendment (providing that those powers not 
given the Federal Government remain with “the States” or “the people”).  
Those provisions arguably refer to “the people” acting collectively—but 
they deal with the exercise or reservation of powers, not rights.
159
 
These wording differences point to a key distinction:  in contrast 
with the Ninth Amendment, the Tenth Amendment speaks of reserving 
“powers,” not “rights.”  Freedom to abstain from purchasing insurance 
can only awkwardly be regarded as a “power.”  More generally, the 
Tenth Amendment is concerned with state sovereignty rather than  
 
enacted state law if that law is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”); Cnty. of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 861 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(criticizing “highly subjective substantive-due-process methodologies”); BMW of N. 
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 599 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that due 
process limits on punitive damages are “insusceptible of principled applica-
tion, . . . constrained by no principle other than the Justices’ subjective assessment of 
the ‘reasonableness’ of the award”).  
157 One critique of substantive due process doctrine comes from United Haulers 
Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority: 
There is a common thread to these arguments:  They are invitations to rigorous-
ly scrutinize economic legislation passed under the auspices of the police power.  
There was a time when this Court presumed to make such binding judgments 
for society, under the guise of interpreting the Due Process Clause.  See Lochner 
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  We should not seek to reclaim that ground for 
judicial supremacy under the banner of the dormant Commerce Clause. 
550 U.S. 330, 347 (2007). 
158 See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 610 (1936) (holding 
that the right to contract for wages in return for work “is a part of the liberty protected 
by the due process clause”). 
159 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579-80 (2008) (footnote omitted). 
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individual liberty.160  The “people” in the Tenth Amendment rather 
clearly are the body politic, and so the Tenth Amendment is concerned 
with political, not individual rights.  Including the people alongside the 
states simply reflects the prevailing libertarian theory that all govern-
ments inherently have limited powers since even the states’ plenary 
powers to govern ultimately derive from the consent of the populace at 
large.161  None of this conceptual landscape offers solid or even plausi-
ble grounds to use the Tenth Amendment to protect individual liberties 
in the same way that it protects states’ sovereignty. 
 
160 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992) (“[T]he Framers expli-
citly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate individu-
als, not States.”).   
161 All nine Justices agreed with this basic principle in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton.  The majority ruled:  
 The “plan of the convention” as illuminated by the historical materials, our 
opinions, and the text of the Tenth Amendment draws a basic distinction be-
tween the powers of the newly created Federal Government and the powers re-
tained by the pre-existing sovereign States.  As Chief Justice Marshall explained, 
“it was neither necessary nor proper to define the powers retained by the States.  
These powers proceed, not from the people of America, but from the people of 
the several States; and remain, after the adoption of the constitution, what they 
were before, except so far as they may be abridged by that instrument.” 
 . . . The text of the Tenth Amendment unambiguously confirms this prin-
ciple . . . . 
514 U.S. 779, 801 (1995) (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 
193 (1819)).  This principle was also echoed in Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion:  
 Our system of government rests on one overriding principle:  All power 
stems from the consent of the people.  
 . . . . 
 When they adopted the Federal Constitution, of course, the people of each 
State surrendered some of their authority to the United States . . . . Because the 
people of the several States are the only true source of power, however, the Fed-
eral Government enjoys no authority beyond what the Constitution confers . . . . 
 . . . [T]he remainder of the people’s powers—“[t]he powers not delegated to 
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,”—are 
either delegated to the state government or retained by the people.  The Feder-
al Constitution does not specify which of these two possibilities obtains . . . .  
 These basic principles are enshrined in the Tenth Amendment, which dec-
lares that all powers neither delegated to the Federal Government nor prohi-
bited to the States “are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”  
With this careful last phrase, the Amendment avoids taking any position on 
the division of power between the state governments and the people of the 
States:  It is up to the people of each State to determine which “reserved” 
powers their state government may exercise. 
Id. at 846-48 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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Finally, even if courts were to make this move, it would be truly 
radical to categorically preclude insurance mandates from the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, regardless of the strength of the public policy 
justifications in particular settings.  Only direct invasions of state sove-
reignty receive such absolute prohibition.  Even the Court’s recent  
exclusion of noneconomic local matters from the commerce power is 
not absolute.  Justice Scalia repeatedly stressed this point in his Gonzales 
v. Raich concurrence: 
Though the conduct in Lopez was not economic, the Court nevertheless 
recognized that it could be regulated as “an essential part of a larger 
regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be 
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated. 
 . . . [A]s the passage from Lopez quoted above suggests, Congress may 
regulate even noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary 
part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.  The relevant 
question is simply whether the means chosen are “reasonably adapted” to 
the attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power. 
 . . . . 
 . . . As Lopez itself states, and the Court affirms today, Congress may 
regulate noneconomic intrastate activities only where the failure to do so 
“could . . . undercut” its regulation of interstate commerce.
162
 
Elsewhere in the Constitution, the most fundamentally protected 
liberties can sometimes be sacrificed or curtailed for sufficiently com-
pelling reasons.  Using the Tenth Amendment to protect “individual 
sovereignty” to be uninsured would provide more protection than the 
Constitution affords many fundamental rights.  Thus, not only would 
this reinstate Lochner -esque protections of economic liberties, but the 
modern constraints would be far stronger than those in the Lochner 
era.163  A categorical rejection of regulating pure inactivity would appear 
 
162 545 U.S. 1, 36-38 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations 
omitted) (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995), and United States 
v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941)). 
163 Professor Smith agrees with this prediction about the potential return of Lochner: 
[I]f the courts import this libertarian objection into federalism doctrine in the 
fashion . . . urged, the protection for individual liberty—and thus the corres-
ponding limitation on federal authority—will be even greater than it would be if 
the limitation were imposed as a matter of substantive due process. . . . Congress 
would be categorically precluded from compelling individuals to take actions 
that they otherwise would prefer not to take, even if the states were simply una-
ble, because of collective action problems, to address a problem of national 
scope and importance. 
Smith, supra note 52, at 24 (emphasis omitted). 
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to preclude, for instance, federal action to mandate vaccinations or 
other preventive measures even in the worst conceivable public health 
emergency, such as an outbreak of the avian flu that realistically might 
threaten tens of millions of lives.164  The Fifth or Ninth Amendments 
would produce no such result because their protections of individual 
liberties are balanced against legitimate government objectives.165 
When striking this balance with respect to economic (rather than 
personal or bodily) liberties, the government’s objectives need not be 
compelling.  Randy Barnett’s analysis under the Ninth Amendment, 
for instance, speaks in terms of a “presumption of liberty”166-–which in-
vokes an intermediate level of scrutiny.  The presumption can be re-
butted by showing “some degree of fit between means and ends and 
that the measure is not simply a pretext.”167 
In the necessary and proper context, then, the most that could 
conceivably be accomplished by questioning the constitutional proprie-
ty of regulating economic inactivity is to heighten the standard of ne-
cessity that the insurance mandate must meet.  The Court’s recent 
Comstock decision can be read in this light.  Its unique multifactor analy-
sis, not present in any prior Necessary and Proper Clause decision, was 
used as a form of heightened scrutiny because of the special federalism 
concerns raised by the federal exercise of a civil commitment power 
that is otherwise the exclusive domain of state police power.168  This 
questionable propriety led the Court to take a close and extensive look 
at the history, justification, and scope of this particular use of the power. 
Importantly, though, Supreme Court decisions since the Lochner era 
have not endorsed or even suggested this heightened scrutiny of neces-
sity for purely economic regulation.  However, even if this higher scru-
tiny were employed, Comstock does not purport to provide the exclusive 
form of scrutiny.  Therefore, the fact that the individual mandate does 
 
164 This point is made by Garrett Epps, What’s at Stake in the GOP’s Challenge to Health 
Care Reform, ATLANTIC (Dec. 15, 2010, 8:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/ 
archive/2010/12/whats-at-stake-in-the-gops-challenge-to-health-care-reform/68022. 
165 See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 29-30, 38 (1905) (holding that 
mandatory vaccination laws do not violate constitutionally protected liberty interests). 
166 Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479, 1495 (2008) (empha-
sis added). 
167 Id. at 1499; see also Barnett, supra note 130, at 207 (“The appropriate ‘level of 
scrutiny’ of a measure’s necessity must lie somewhere in between” strict and rational 
basis); Randy E. Barnett, The Golden Mean Between Kurt & Dan:  A Moderate Reading of the 
Ninth Amendment, 56 DRAKE L. REV. 897, 904 (2008) (“[A]ll it means to protect the 
other liberties retained by the people is to put the government to its proof.”). 
168 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956-65 (2010). 
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not fully meet each element of Comstock’s tailor-made scrutiny is of no 
import, as long as the mandate has strong justification in its own par-
ticular context.  As previously discussed,169 a mandate to obtain health 
insurance meets the highest plausible levels of justification.  It is an 
integral aspect of PPACA’s requirement that insurers cover all appli-
cants regardless of their health condition.  Without the mandate, all 
sides of the debate agree that PPACA’s other, perfectly valid regulatory 
provisions would seriously harm the market.170  In the end, this is all 
one needs to safely conclude that the individual mandate fits comfort-
ably under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  Otherwise, a court would 
have to conclude, in Lochner-esque fashion, that Congress lacks any 
feasible authority to prohibit medical screening by insurers, regardless 
of the consequences for national markets in health insurance. 
III.  LIMITLESS FEDERAL POWER 
We now return to the overriding objection that if the individual 
mandate were allowed, there would be no stopping Congress from 
mandating the purchase of anything it pleases.  Mandatory purchases 
have substantial economic impact almost by definition; since most 
goods and services are part of a national market, a mandate to pur-
chase just about any product might be constitutionally justified as an 
aspect of regulating that market or a related market.  Surely, the ar-
gument goes, whichever way one reads these two clauses and their 
precedents, the Constitution cannot allow such a result. 
This slippery slope concern is not merely a free-floating anxiety; it 
plays a fairly precise doctrinal role in two different respects.  First, as a 
public policy concern, a steep slope warns us to avoid construing am-
biguous terms and concepts in ways that could have untoward conse-
quences.  In this purely public policy mode, the argument’s strength 
depends on the actual risk that Congress might enact oppressive laws.  
The alternative mode of argument is based mainly on pure logic.  This 
alternative asks whether abuse is a theoretical possibility, with the like-
lihood of actual abuse having much less relevance.  This version of the 
argument has a syllogistic form that has been labeled the “non-infinity 
principle.”171  Its major premise is that, by constitutional design, feder-
 
169 See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. 
170 See supra Section II.A. 
171 See Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or 
What if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 WIS. L. 
REV. 369, 378 (explaining that, under the non-infinity principle, “any justification for 
HALL REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 6/4/2011  1:56 PM 
2011] Commerce Clause Challenges to Health Care Reform 1865 
al powers can never be unlimited.  Therefore, any power or rationale 
that in theory has no bounds cannot be “proper” or “consist[ent] with 
the letter and spirit of the constitution.”172  In making this argument, it 
matters little how unlikely or absurd hypothetical extensions might be 
as long as they are imaginable.  Hence, we see widespread discussion 
of whether upholding the individual mandate would allow Congress to 
mandate the purchase of broccoli or other noxious green vegetables.173 
One effective response to these arguments is simply to note that re-
gulating inactivity does not literally “remove all limits on federal power” 
or make it “virtually impossible to posit anything that Congress would be 
without power to regulate,” as the Florida court surmised.174  In terms of 
pure logic, regulating inactivity is no more unlimited than regulating 
activity, as long as the same limits apply to each.  The Court’s decisions 
in Lopez and Morrison rejected regulation of local matters that are non-
economic.175  There is no reason to assume this same subject matter lim-
it would not also apply to the regulation of inactivity.  If so, allowing 
Congress to mandate insurance still would not allow it to require the 
possession of handguns near schools, any more than it can prohibit 
their possession. 
Beyond this noneconomic limit, a long list of other, express consti-
tutional provisions limit even the most expansive federal powers.  Com-
prehensive authority to regulate national markets still does not allow 
Congress to force people to eat (rather than merely purchase) broccoli, 
to post billboards on their houses, to open their stores on Sunday 
mornings, or to obtain insurance only on one side of the Mississippi 
River or in states that vote for Democrats.  Each of these examples, and 
 
congressional power must not be one that would undermine the very notion of enu-
merated powers.  If the definition of ‘commerce’ used to uphold a statute is one that 
would allow Congress to regulate everything under the commerce power, then the sta-
tute must fall.”). 
172 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 420-21 (1819).  
173 Kevin Sack, Both Sides See a Nod to the Tea Party in Judge’s Health Care Ruling, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 2, 2011, at A16. 
174 Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-0091, 2011 
WL 285683, at *22, *33 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011).  The court also concluded, incorrectly, 
that the government’s defense of the law has “no stopping point” and is “without logi-
cal limitation.”  Id. at *29. 
175 See supra note 51; see also Mead v. Holder, No. 10-0950, 2011 WL 611139, at *21 
(D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011) (“There is a straightforward response to the ‘parade of hor-
ribles’ claim:  the limits on Congress’s Commerce Clause power are spelled out clearly 
in Lopez and Morrison.  These two cases establish that (1) the activity . . . must be eco-
nomic in nature, [and] (2) the link between the activity and interstate commerce must 
not be too attenuated . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
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many others, would violate (or raise serious questions under) the First, 
Fifth, or Fourteenth Amendment.  These are just some among the 
many constitutional norms that continue to fence arbitrary or abusive 
federal power, even if purchase mandates are permitted.176 
The Necessary and Proper Clause provides a third response to the 
limitless-power concern.  Challengers caricature the government’s de-
fense as claiming that mandating insurance is a convenient way to in-
crease coverage or stimulate the health-services economy.  That straw 
man is the premise of challengers’ hypotheticals about mandating the 
purchase of American cars or health-club memberships.  But, as the 
Florida court explained at length, the full-bodied PPACA includes the 
mandate as an integral aspect of Congress’s exercise of an enume-
rated power—the unquestioned authority to regulate how insurers de-
sign, market, and sell their products in interstate commerce.177  Op-
ponents’ hypothetical laws are aimed mostly at freestanding measures 
for increasing desirable consumer behavior.  Thus, they lack the es-
sential attribute of the Necessary and Proper Clause that ties these hy-
pothetical mandates tightly to a distinct and enumerated regulatory 
power.  Even if compulsory health insurance is upheld as necessary 
and proper, Congress still could not mandate the purchase of broccoli 
unless doing so is, without piling “inference upon inference,”178 truly 
an important part of a larger regulatory scheme that the Commerce 
Clause independently permits. 
Even if we can imagine arguments for other purchase mandates, re-
jecting the slippery slope argument does not require a guarantee that 
Congress will never again impose a pure purchase mandate.  Instead, it 
is only necessary to note that upholding this one mandate does not 
permit all others.  No matter how many hypotheticals are put forward, 
they fail to undermine the principle of limited government for the 
same reason that the laws upheld in Comstock, Raich, and Lopez do not.  
In each, the Court held or recognized that otherwise disallowed powers 
are, in some circumstances, “an essential part of a larger regulation of 
 
176 The Florida court failed to observe the clear constitutional distinction between 
purchase mandates and consumption mandates when it stated that “it would seem only 
logical under the defendants’ rationale that Congress may also regulate the ‘economic 
decisions’ not to go to the doctor for regular check-ups and screenings,” Bondi, 2011 
WL 285683, at *29 n.25, or that “Congress could require that people buy and consume 
broccoli at regular intervals,” id. at *24.  
177 Id. at *37. 
178 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995). 
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economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut”179 
without the unenumerated power.  The very circumstances required to 
make this so are themselves the limits that prevent the Necessary and 
Proper Clause from becoming a source of boundless federal powers. 
Tying the mandate to PPACA’s insurance regulations limits the 
plausible range of other hypothetical mandates, not only because of the 
tightness of the link, but also because there are inherent limits in the 
base regulatory power itself.  Thus, we need not worry that in bizarre 
circumstances the military power, for instance, might also be invoked to 
mandate the purchase of broccoli.180  Although this and many other 
scenarios are only barely conceivable, they are at least theoretically possi-
ble, which is all that is needed to argue that the possibility could un-
dermine the law’s constitutional propriety or contravene the Constitu-
tion’s spirit.  Likewise, one could also use the spending and postal 
powers to purchase broccoli and mail it to every citizen once a week, for 
some plausible public purpose.  None of these bare theoretical possibil-
ities give us pause when construing the scope of those other, enume-
rated powers because each power is limited by its core domain, whether 
it be military purpose, interstate commerce, or general welfare. 
Finally, having rejected (on several grounds) the syllogistic argu-
ment based on pure logic, all that remains is the generalized policy 
concern that upholding compulsory health insurance might lead to 
an actual abuse of power.  This pragmatic argument plays only a cau-
tionary doctrinal role; it does not, by itself, determine an outcome.  
This concern, if realistic, has less force under challenges to the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause than to the core Commerce Clause.  This is 
because allowing an insurance mandate under the enumerated power 
arguably requires an expansive interpretation of “[t]o regulate Com-
merce.”  However, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, opponents 
ask the courts to impose a new doctrinal limit-–one that either contra-
dicts or goes considerably beyond limits currently recognized under 
that clause.  Pragmatic policy concerns are less compelling when given 
as reasons to aggressively contract federal power than when used to 
avoid new expansions. 
Under either guise, the democratic process safely checks the realis-
tic threat of abuse.  Almost two centuries ago, Justice Joseph Story made 
 
179 See, e.g., id. at 561. 
180 Shortly after the Civil War, the Court upheld the unenumerated power to 
mandate that paper currency be accepted as legal tender for all debts, based in part on 
this being a necessary and proper extension of Congress’s war powers.  Legal Tender 
Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 534-38 (1870). 
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this point eloquently in direct reference to a liberal construction of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause: 
 It is no valid objection to this doctrine to say, that it is calculated to 
extend the powers of the government throughout the entire sphere of 
state legislation.  The same thing may be said, and has been said, in re-
gard to every exercise of power by implication and construction.  There 
is always some chance of error, or abuse of every power; but this furnish-
es no ground of objection against the power; and certainly no reason for 
an adherence to the most rigid construction of its terms, which would at 
once arrest the whole movements of the government.  The remedy for 
any abuse, or misconstruction of the power, is the same, as in similar 
abuses and misconstructions of the state governments.  It is by an appeal 
to the other departments of the government; and finally to the people, 
in the exercise of their elective franchises.
181
 
Justice Clarence Thomas expressed the same sentiment early in 
his Court tenure:  “In areas of social and economic policy, . . . ‘[t]he 
Constitution presumes that, absent some reason to infer antipathy, 
even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the demo-
cratic process, and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted 
no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted.’”182  
Or, as Justice Thurgood Marshall brusquely put it, “The Constitution 
does not prohibit legislatures from enacting stupid laws.”183 
Similar slippery slope concerns can and have been made regard-
ing almost any power that Congress possesses.  Even as the Constitu-
tion was being debated, Alexander Hamilton noted that a “sample of 
this is to be observed in the exaggerated and improbable suggestions 
which have taken place respecting the power of calling for the services 
of the militia.”184  A century and a half later, those who opposed Social 
 
181 3 STORY, supra note 60, § 1247 (footnote omitted).  
182 FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993) (quoting Vance v. 
Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979)).  Seven other Justices joined the opinion. 
183 N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 209 (2008) (Stevens, 
J., concurring).   
184 THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, supra note 135, at 178 (Alexander Hamilton).  Hamil-
ton elaborated with examples of absurd speculations such as that the militia of  
New Hampshire is to be marched to Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of 
New York to Kentucky, and of Kentucky to Lake Champlain.  Nay, the debts due 
to the French and Dutch are to be paid in militiamen instead of Louis d’ors 
and ducats.  At one moment there is to be a large army to lay prostrate the liber-
ties of the people; at another moment the militia of Virginia are to be dragged 
from their homes five or six hundred miles to tame the republican contumacy 
of Massachusetts; and that of Massachusetts is to be transported an equal dis-
tance to subdue the refractory haughtiness of the aristocratic Virginians. 
Id. at 182. 
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Security warned that Congress someday might lower the retirement 
age to thirty.185  Congress could use the power to criminalize to make 
the most trivial of things affecting commerce a federal crime.  The tax 
power could be pushed to the verge of being confiscatory.  The emi-
nent domain power, coupled with a broad conception of public pur-
pose, could be used to turn vast swaths of homes and businesses over to 
private development companies.  Some even suspect the mundane 
postal power of harboring the threat “that Congress could constitution-
ally nationalize all forms of communication and transportation,”186 but, 
as scholars noted long ago, while “[t]his may be true in logic, . . . it has 
not yet taken place.”187 
Admittedly, modern versions of most federal powers are sweeping, 
and so it is possible to conjure up seemingly infinite despotic applica-
tions.  Most recently, one of the same lawyers pursuing the Florida 
challenge to compulsory health insurance wrote with regard to the 
constitutionality of FDA regulation, “If government can limit Ameri-
cans’ choice of effective medical treatments, there’s no limit to its con-
trol over our bodies, and the right to bodily autonomy is an illusion.”188  
The Founders, in terms still relevant today, sometimes scorned those 
who reasoned in this fashion.  Hamilton, for instance, responded as 
follows to those who argued that the federal power to call up the mili-
tia could be abused to suppress civil liberties: 
 There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the idea of 
danger to liberty from the militia [composed of fellow citizens], that one 
is at a loss whether to treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to con-
sider it as a mere trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a dis-
ingenuous artifice to instil[l] prejudices at any price; or as the serious 
offspring of political fanaticism. 
 . . . . 
 
185 Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant-Respondent at 54, Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 
(1937) (No. 08-0910), 1937 WL 40760, at *54 (arguing that if “Congress may impose 
on a non-wealthy few the support of the many over sixty-five years of age, . . . Congress 
may do the same as to the support of those over thirty years of age”).  The brief con-
tinues, “Picture, if you will, the consternation of the men of the thirteen sovereign 
States, engaged in considering whether or not to enter into the compact of the Consti-
tution, if they had been told that they were handing over to the new Nation the control 
of the way in which the aged within a State, needy or wealthy, should be sup-
ported . . . .”  Id. at 53. 
186 Project:  Post Office, supra note 60, at 715 n.571 (citing ROGERS, supra note 60, at 
151-52, 155-57). 
187 Id. 
188 David B. Rivkin Jr. & Elizabeth Price Foley, ‘Death Panels’ Come Back to Life, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 2010, at A15. 
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 . . . Do the persons who rave at this rate imagine that their art or their 
eloquence can impose any conceits or absurdities upon the people of 
America . . . ? 
 . . . Are suppositions of this sort the sober admonitions of discerning 
patriots to a discerning people?  Or are they the inflammatory ravings of 
incendiaries or distempered enthusiasts?
189
 
None of these specters of governmental tyranny has materialized, 
and none will, because elected representatives will not allow it.  As 
Hamilton concluded, “If we were even to suppose the national rulers 
actuated by the most ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to be-
lieve that they would employ such preposterous means to accomplish 
their designs.”190  There is nothing about purchase mandates that make 
them less sensitive than any other legislative measure to rational delibe-
ration and democratic electoral constraints.  If anything, the unique-
ness of the individual mandate only seems to have added to its social 
controversy and thus to the heightened political sensitivities about basic 
libertarian concerns.  Whether to repeal or amend the mandate is cur-
rently under very active political debate and will likely remain so for 
several years to come.191 
It would clearly be constitutional for Congress to increase taxes or 
reallocate general revenues in order to expand social insurance, but 
politics sharply constrain this option.  These political constraints were 
very much on the mind of the district judge in Northern Florida when 
he rejected the government’s argument that the individual mandate is 
an exercise of the taxing power.  The court reasoned that it “seems 
likely that the members of Congress merely called it a penalty and did 
not describe it as revenue-generating to try and insulate themselves 
from the potential electoral ramifications of their votes.”192  These same 
political constraints led Congress instead to require residents to select 
their own insurance.  Thus, it would be blatantly contradictory to cite 
the intense political climate surrounding the passage of health reform193 
 
189 THE FEDERALIST NO. 29, supra note 135, at 181-83 (Alexander Hamilton). 
190 Id. at 183. 
191 See Henry J. Aaron, The Midterm Elections—High Stakes for Health Policy, 363 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1685, 1685 (2010) (“[T]he political battle over health care reform will 
continue into the 2012 presidential elections and probably beyond.”). 
192 Florida ex rel. McCollum v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 
1120, 1142 (N.D. Fla. 2010). 
193 See id. (“[T]he Act was very controversial at the time of passage. . . . [T]he legis-
lation required lawmakers in favor of the bill to cast politically difficult and tough 
votes. . . . [B]y far the most publicized and controversial part of the Act was the indi-
vidual mandate . . . .”).   
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as a reason to reject one basis of congressional authority and, at the 
same time, to reject the regulatory path Congress chose because of the 
imagined inability of the political process to restrain hypothetical future 
exercises of this alternative federal power.  If political forces constrain 
the taxing power, they will also constrain the commerce power. 
CONCLUSION 
Writing at this length about these intricate arguments may convey 
the false impression that the issues are more complicated than they 
actually are.  Accordingly, a useful summary might recapitulate exactly 
what is at issue and what each side in the litigation must establish in 
order to prevail.  There is no substantial dispute, and even some overt 
agreement, that PPACA’s mandate to obtain health insurance is inex-
tricably intertwined with its other insurance regulations, which are 
clearly constitutional.  But disagreement remains on three questions: 
1) Does being uninsured entail economic activity? 
2) May Congress use its commerce power to regulate economic inactivity 
by requiring most legal residents to obtain a product? 
3) Is it per se constitutionally “improper” to compel most legal residents 
to have health insurance? 
For challengers to prevail, they must convince courts to rule “no” 
on the first two questions and “yes” on the third.  For the government 
to prevail, it need win only one of these points.  The first two issues are 
contestable:  the government might, or might not, prevail on one or 
both of them.  The third point has no basis in existing precedent or 
principle, and reaching this conclusion would contradict centuries of 
precedent and threaten broad swaths of the modern regulatory state.  
This radical result may be the goal of at least some challengers, but it is 
implausible to think they can convince five Justices (or perhaps even a 
panel of appellate judges), to go along with such a revolutionary juris-
prudential move.  Slippery slope concerns are significant, but they can 
be handled in this context at least as well as they have been for a host of 
other federal powers.  Moreover, categorically barring the regulation of 
inactivity in order to avoid hypothetical concerns at all costs would foo-
lishly hamstring the federal government’s ability to counter truly frigh-
tening threats to public health. 
Thus, in the end, the acknowledged undesirability, if not impossi-
bility, of banning medical screening without a requirement to obtain 
insurance is the core of the government’s strongest defense.  Even if 
the mandate is not squarely within Congress’s commerce power, it 
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meets a high threshold of necessity to accomplish the overall reform 
scheme, which is clearly within congressional power, to create a market 
structure in which no one is ever again medically uninsurable. 
 
